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EQUAL EDUCATIONAL
OPPORTUNITY: A CASE
FOR THE CHILDREN
INTRODUCTION

Children are at once our most precious national resource and our
most vulnerable minority. Education-and for the overwhelming number of American children that means public school education-is our
best hope of developing that resource to its fullest potential. Education
is basic to the exercise of even those interests recognized by the United
States Supreme Court as so fundamental that they constitutionally require special protection.' Its infringement is a denial of what Americans
have always professed to value most about the theory of our system:
the opportunity to begin adult life free of competitive disadvantage,
save that of a wholly personal nature.
So well have these principles been recognized that, since the
late nineteenth century, state constitutions have typically made education a state responsibility to be met by the legislature in establishing
and maintaining a system of free public schools.2 Within all but

* This article is a student work prepared by Kathaleen B. Burke, a member of
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEw and St. Thomas More Institute for Legal Research.
1 A classification that might infringe upon the voting interest, for example, has
been held to require very strict judicial scrutiny under the equal protection clause.
Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
2 See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. IX, § 5 (1879); FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 1 (1968),
formerly FLA. CONST. art XII, § 1 (1885), derived from FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 2
(1868); ILL. CONST. art. X, § 1 (1970), formerly ILL. CONST. art. VIII, § 1 (1870);
MICH. CONST. art. VIII, § 2 (1963), revised from MICH. CONST. art. XI, § 9
(1908); MINN. CONST. art. VIII, § 1 (1857); N.Y. CONST. art. XI, § 1 (1938),
formerly N.Y. CONST. art. IX, § 1 (1894); VA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1 (1971),
formerly VA. CONST. art. VIII, § 129 (1902).
See generally A. WISE, RICH SCHOOLS, POOR SCHOOLS: THE PROMISE OF EQUAL
EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY 93-118 (1968) [hereinafter WtSE]. Primitive forms of
state aid were probably available to school districts in the early 1800's. Status and
Impact of Educational Finance Programs, 4 NATIONAL EDUCATIONAL FINANCE
PROJECT 1-2 (1971) [hereinafter 4 NEFP].
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one3 of the state systems, however, great
disparities in funds and facilities can be
found from school district to school district. 4 School financing schemes have, with
legislative sanction, remained tied to the
locally collected and retained real property
tax and thus to local wealth; 5 the disparities
attest to the inability of patchwork state
''equalization" plans to modify that basic
structure. Fiscal commitment has simply
not followed the policy recognition of responsibility.

clause. 7 The rationale was that the California plan unconstitutionally conditions
the full enjoyment of a fundamental interest
on a wealth classification. The court's holding in Serrano v. Priest is as potentially farreaching in its political and sociological
impact as in its constitutional law implications. The ruling came on an appeal from
an order of dismissal entered by the Superior Court of Los Angeles County.8 The
dismissal had been affirmed by California's
Court of Appeal for the Second District."

Until 1968, resource distribution inequities that would have been considered
intolerable in any other area of state-provided service went unchallenged in school
finance arrangements. At that time, the
systems came under vigorous attack but the
initial skirmishes were highly discouraging,
from both legal and practical standpoints,
for the challengers. 6

The class action was brought by elementary, intermediate, junior high and high
school students of Los Angeles County on
behalf of all California public school students except those
[iln that school district, the identity of
which is presently unknown, which .

.

. af-

fords the greatest educational opportunity
of all .... 10

SERRANO V. PRIEST

Against this background, the California
Supreme Court recently indicated that that
state's educational financing scheme will
probably soon be held void under the
fourteenth amendment's equal protection

They were joined by their parents and
guardians (residents and property owners
of Los Angeles County) acting on behalf
of all parents of children in the California
school system who are real property owners.
Defendants were the Treasurer, Superintendent of Public Instruction and Controller
of the State of California and, in a repre-

3 Hawaii has a completely centralized system
of school finance. 6 HAWAII REV. LAWS ch.39

(supp. 1965).
4 See notes 11-12, 80-83 and accompanying text

infra.
5 Wealth is used throughout in the specialized
sense of a district's assessed valuation per pupil.
6, See Burruss v. Wilkerson, 310 F. Supp. 572
(W.D. Va. 1969), afJ'd mere., 397 U.S. 44
(1970); Mclnnis v. Shapiro, 293 F. Supp. 327
(N.D. 111. 1968), a/J'd mem. sub nom. Mclnnis
v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 322 (1969).

7

Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241,

96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971) (6-1).
s Serrano v. Priest, Civil No. 938254 (Cal. Sup.
Ct., demurrers sustained, Jan. 8, 1969; dismissed,

Mar. 17, 1969).
9 Serrano v. Priest, 10 Cal. App. 3d 1110, 89 Cal.
Rptr. 345 (2d Ct. App. 1970).
10 Complaint at 8, Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d
584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971).
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sentative capacity, the Tax Collector and
Treasurer of Los Angeles County.
Plaintiffs cited wealth" differentials of
over 100 to 1 among Los Angeles County
school districts 12 resulting in per pupil expenditures which ranged from $1,317.64
to $428.34 among the elementary school
districts of that county in 1966-1967.13
The legislative scheme authorizing such
gross differences was alleged to violate the
equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment and the "fundamental law and
Constitution of the State of California.

14

A non-equal protection claim was that the
financing system was void under Article
IX, section 5 of the California Constitution
directing the legislature to provide "a sys15
tem of common schools."1

11

See note 5 supra.

12 Complaint Exhibit "B", Serrano v. Priest, 5
Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601
(1971).
13 Id., Exhibit "D". The Los Angeles County
figures were paralleled by those for the state as
a whole. Id., Exhibits "A" & "C."
14 Id. at 12. Specifically mentioned were article
I, sections 11 and 21, of the California Constitution. Id. at 10. Those sections have been held to
be "'substantially the equivalent'" of the equal
protection clause. 5 Cal. 3d at 596 n.11, 487 P.2d
at 1249 n.ll, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 609 n.ll.
Article 1, § 11, reads:
All laws of a general nature shall have a uniform operation.
Article I, § 21, provides:
No special privileges or immunities shall ever
be granted which may not be altered, revoked
or repealed by the Legislature; nor shall any
citizen, or class of citizens, be granted privileges or immunities which, upon the same
terms, shall not be granted to all citizens.
15 This claim was raised, not in the complaint,
but in plaintiff-appellants' opening brief before
the California court of appeal. Appellants' Open-

With its heavy dependence on local
taxes,' " the financing system was said to

deny to plaintiff children, "educational opportunities substantially equal to those enjoyed by children. . . in. . .other districts
of the state,"'1 7 by unconstitutionally making the quality of their education "a function of the wealth of . . . [their] parents
and neighbors" 18 and of "the geographical
accident of... [their] school district ....
"19
Equal protection was alleged to have been
denied California parents in that, "as a
direct result of the ... scheme," they were

required to pay higher tax rates for the
same or lesser educational opportunities
as those afforded children of parents in
20

other districts.

The relief sought was a declaration of
invalidity of the financing scheme, an order
that school funds (including those derived
from real property taxes) be reallocated so

ing Brief at 34-39, Serrano v. Priest, 10 Cal. App.
3d 1110, 89 Cal. Rptr. 345 (2d Ct. App. 1970).
It was, nevertheless, considered by the state court
of appeal and the state supreme court as if it had
been raised in the complaint.
Article IX, § 5, states:
The Legislature shall provide for a system of
common schools by which a free school shall
be kept up and supported in each district at
least six months in every year after the first
year in which a school has been established.
16 Local property taxes were found to have accounted for 57.7 percent of California's school
revenues in 1968-69; state aid and federal funds
contributed 35.5 and 6.1 percent respectively of
the district budgets. 5 Cal. 3d at 591-92 n.2, 487
P.2d at 1246 n.2, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 606 n.2.
17 Complaint at 12, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d
1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971).
18 Id.
19 Id.
20

Id. at 15.
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as not to deny California children and parents equal protection, and a retention of
jurisdiction by the trial court while the legislature and defendants were given time to
21
restructure the system.
The supreme court abruptly dismissed
plaintiff's contentions based on article IX,
22
section 5, of the California Constitution,

21
22

Id. at 16-17.
5 Cal. 3d at 595-96, 487 P.2d at 1248-49, 96

Cal. Rptr. at 608-09. The court acknowledged
that it had previously held that the section implied
a unity of purpose as well as an entirety of
operation, and the direction to the legislature
to provide a system of common schools means
one system ....

Id. at 595, 487 P.2d at 1248, 96 Cal. Rptr. at
608, quoting Kennedy v. Miller, 97 Cal. 429, 432,
32 P. 558, 559 (1893) (emphasis in original).
Nevertheless, it stated,
[W]e have never interpreted the constitutional
provision to require equal school spending; we
have ruled only that the educational system
must be uniform in terms of the prescribed
course of study and educational progression
from grade to grade.
Id. at 596, 487 P.2d at 1249, 96 Cal. Rptr. at
609.
In the California constitutional scheme, the
declaration of state responsibility is followed by
another section on school finance which was also
held by the court to preclude the attack, since it
"specifically authorizes the very element of the
fiscal system of which plaintiffs complain." Id.,
487 P.2d at 1249, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 609.
CAL. CONST. art. IX, § 6, reads in pertinent
part:
The legislature shall provide for the levying
annually by the governing body of each
county, and city and county, of such school
district taxes ...

as will produce in each fiscal

year such revenue for each school district as
the governing board thereof shall determine is
required .

...

Even if article IX, sections 5 and 6, are wholly
inconsistent, said the Serrano court, section 6
must prevail because it is the more specific pro-

1972

but held that a cause of action was stated
under the equal protection provisions of
the fourteenth amendment and California's

vision and was adopted more recently. Answering the identical points made by defendants to

the Court of Appeal (Respondents' Brief at 6670, Serrano v. Priest, 10 Cal. App. 3d 1110, 89
Cal. Rptr. 345 (2d Ct. App. 1970)), plaintiffs
had argued:
[T]he disparities in revenue ... are so substantial . . . that the student attending school in a

poor district receives an education which does
not equip him to move from one grade to another .

. .

. Rather he is subjected to a sepa-

rate, distinct, and markedly inferior school
system. The result of the current school financing scheme is the creation of a series of
school districts providing various kinds of education with only the veneer of uniformity.
Appellants' Petition for Rehearing at 10, Serrano v. Priest, 10 Cal. App. 3d 1110, 89 Cal.
Rptr. 345 (2d Ct. App. 1970).
It seems legitimate to ask why the court so
readily adopted the defendants' point of view in
face of plaintiffs' assertion that the financing
method "produces separate and distinct systems."
5 Cal. 3d at 595, 487 P.2d at 1248, 96 Cal. Rptr.
at 608. Using the opinion's own statement that
"[e]lementary principles of construction dictate
that where constitutional provisions can reasonably be construed to avoid a conflict, such an
interpretation should be adopted," (Id. at 596,
487 P.2d at 1249, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 609) could
not section 6 have been read as fitting within the
framework established by, and therefore limited
by section 5? Such a construction would not have
necessarily required "equal spending" but would
have prohibited substantial disparities. Certainly,
the language of section 6, "such revenue . . . as
the governing board . . . shall determine is re-

quired," (emphasis added) does not indicate
that school boards are to have unlimited discretion. The court was apparently so well disposed
toward the equal protection argument that it
overlooked the California constitutional possibilities. This is perhaps an unfair statement, however, since article I, section 5, remained in the
background of plaintiffs' case throughout. See
note 15 supra and note 50 infra. The reconciliation of sections 5 and 6 suggested above was
never proposed.

EDUCATIONAL
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article I, sections 1 I and 21. This controversial holding was so widely misconstrued
as immediately invalidating the statutory
finance scheme and the use of the local
23
property tax to support public schools
that the court subsequently issued a modification of the original opinion.24 The modification can be of small comfort to California
legislators, however, since the opinion took
judicial notice of so many government-reported facts about the structure and effects
of the funding plan, 25 that a declaration of
unconstitutionality by the Los Angeles
County Superior Court seems inevitable.
Justice Sullivan's equal protection analysis26 for the majority was grounded on the
premise that the United States Supreme
Court has established two distinct tests of

23

E.g.,

NEWSWEEK,

Sept. 13, 1971, at 61;

TIME,

Sept. 13, 1971, at 47; N.Y. Times, Sept. 19,
1971, at 45, col. I; id., Sept. 2, 1971, at 32, col. 1
and 55, col. 2; id., Aug. 31, 1971, at 23, col. 2.
24 Serrano v. Priest, Modification of Opinion,
L.A. No. 29820 (filed Oct. 21, 1971). The modification stressed that the earlier decision was
"not a final judgment on the merits." Id. at 1.
And that, if the trial court should declare the
present system of school finance unconstitutional,
relief should be purely prospective:
Obviously, any judgment invalidating the existing system of public school financing should
make clear that the existing system is to remain operable until an appropriate new system, which is not violative of equal protection
of the laws, can be put into effect.
Id. at 2.
25 5 Cal. 3d at 591-95, 487 P.2d at 1245-48, 96
Cal. Rptr. at 605-08.
20 The entire analysis was couched in terms of
the content of the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment but the court held the
discussion equally applicable to plaintiffs' claims
under article I, sections 11 and 21, of the California Constitution. Id. at 596 n.11, 487 P.2d at
1249 n.11, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 609 n.11. See note
14 supra.

the validity of legislation under the equal
protection clause. The traditional test of
the rationality of the relationship between
classification and ends sought to be
achieved is applicable when economic regulations are challenged; a different standard
involving close judicial scrutiny is employed when a classification is itself "invidious" or "suspect" or when the interest
affected by it is deemed "fundamental."
When the latter test is used, only a "compelling state interest" can justify the classifi27
cation.
Wealth, said the Serrano majority, has
been repeatedly established by the Supreme

Id. at 597, 487 P.2d at 1249-50, 96 Cal. Rptr.
at 609-10, citing the California Supreme Court's
own exposition of the two-level test in Westbrook
v. Mihaly, 2 Cal. 3d 765, 784-85, 471 P.2d 487,
500, 87 Cal. Rptr. 839, 852, vacated on other
grounds, 403 U.S. 922 (1971). The existence of
a two-level test probably first gained notice when
Mr. Justice Stone, speaking for the Court in
United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144
(1938), a case involving economic regulation,
stated in a footnote:
There may be narrower scope for operation of
the presumption of constitutionality when legislation appears on its face to be within a specific
prohibition of the constitution ....
• . . [L]egislation which restricts those political
processes which can ordinarily be expected to
bring about the repeal of undesirable legis27

lation . . . [may be subjected to] more exact-

ing judicial scrutiny ....
... . [P]rejudice against discrete and insular
minorities may be a special condition, which
tends seriously to curtail the operation of those
political processes ordinarily to be relied upon
to protect minorities, and which may call for
a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry ....

Id. at 152-53 n.4 (citations omitted).
The possibilities of the doctrine were explored
in a classic article on equal protection. Tussman
& tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws,
38 CALIF. L. REV. 341, 353-81 (1949).
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Court as a "suspect classification" for equal
protection purposes.2 8 Plaintiffs' contention
that the school financing scheme classified
(and thus apportioned educational quality)
on the basis of wealth, was found "irrefut29
able.-

1972

Moreover, education was held to be a
fundamental interest.3 0 In reaching this de-

lishments. Surely, this is to rely on the most
irrelevant of factors as the basis for educational financing.

28 5 Cal. 3d at 597-603, 487 P.2d at 1250-55, 96

Cal. Rptr. at 610-15, quoting Harper v. Virginia
Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 668 (1966) and
McDonald v. Board of Elections, 394 U.S. 802,
807 (1969). The quoted cases equated lines
drawn on the basis of wealth with racial distinctions and labelled both "highly suspect" when
they endanger access to the vote. A second line
of cases cited as authority for the proposition
that wealth is a suspect classification was the
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (right of
indigent criminal defendant to free transcript on
appeal)-Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353
(1963)
(right of indigent to court-appointed
counsel on appeal) series.
29 5 Cal. 3d at 598, 604, 614, 487 P.2d at 250,
1255, 1263, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 610, 615, 623.
Plaintiffs had charged the existence of classification based on two types of wealth: district wealth
and the personal wealth of residents of the various districts. See text accompanying notes 18 and
19 supra. For purposes of the hearing on demurrer, the alleged correlations between district
wealth (assessed valuation per pupil) and individual wealth were deemed admitted. Id. at
601, 487 P.2d at 1252, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 615.
This is one of two evidentiary issues that remain
to be settled on remand. See note 85 infra. Even
if resolved adverse to the plaintiffs, however, it
will apparently not affect the outcome, because the California supreme court majority declared discrimination on the basis of district
wealth "equally invalid" as that on the basis of
individual wealth. Id. at 601, 487 P.2d at 1252,
96 Cal. Rptr. at 612. Although the correlation
might be questionable where commercial and industrial property significantly enhanced a district's tax base,
[t]o allot more educational dollars to the
children of one district than to those of another merely because of the fortuitous presence
of such property is to make the quality of a
child's education dependent upon the location
of private commercial and industrial estab-

Id., 487 P.2d at 1252-53, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 612-13.
The link between district wealth, individual
wealth and expenditures per pupil has since been
firmly established by an affidavit filed October 1,
1971 in support of a claim similar to Serrano.
Rodriguez v. San Antonio Independent School
Dist., Civil Action No. 68-175-SA (W.D. Tex.,
filed July 30, 1968). See note 163 infra.
30 5 Cal. 3d at 604-10, 487 P.2d at 1255-59, 96

Cal. Rptr. at 615-19. Although the specific issue
in Serrano-whether education is a fundamental
interest that cannot be conditioned on wealthwas admittedly "not supported by any direct
authority" (id. at 604, 487 P.2d at 1255, 96 Cal.
Rptr. at 615), the court relied upon an abundance
of dicta in its own and United States Supreme
Court opinions.
The most often-cited enshrinement of education appeared in Brown v. Board of Educ., 347
U.S. 483 (1954):

Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and local governments.
Compulsory school attendance laws and the
great expenditures for education both demonstrate our recognition of the importance of
education to our democratic society. It is required in the performance of our most basic
public responsibilities, even service in the
armed forces. It is the very foundation of good
citizenship. Today it is a principal instrument
in awakening the child to cultural values, in
preparing him for later professional training,
and in helping him to adjust normally to his
environment. In these days, it is doubtful that
any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of
an education. Such an opportunity, where the
state has undertaken to provide it, is a right
which must be made available to all on equal
terms.

Id. at 493 (emphasis added).
The Brown dictum is phrased so forcefully that
it might almost be considered decisive on the
educational finance issue except for the fact that
the overriding concern of the case was clearly
racial discrimination. This has been shown con-
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termination, the court was most swayed by
the following characteristics of education:

4) it "is unmatched in the extent to
which it molds the personality of the youth
of society;

1) it "is essential in maintaining what
several commentators have termed 'free
enterprise democracy'-that is, preserving
an individual's opportunity to compete successfully in the economic marketplace, de'
spite a disadvantaged background; "31
2) it "is universally relevant" in contrast
to other services such as police and fire
32
protection;
3) it "continues over a lengthy period of
life .

. .

. [flew other government services

have such sustained, intensive contact with
'33
the recipient;

clusively by the post-Brown segregation cases.
Serrano defendants thus were able to argue,
"[T]he racial cases do not suggest a constitutional
difference [between] motor buses, golf, swimming and education." Respondents' Brief at 53,
Serrano v. Priest, 10 Cal. App. 3d 1110, 89 Cal.
Rptr. 345 (2d Ct. App. 1970). It would be
fairer to say that Brown certainly suggests (very
persuasively) a constitutional difference; it simply
does not dictate it.
A recent United States Supreme Court opinion,
cited by the Serrano majority, supports this latter
view. In upholding the right of a municipality to
shut down its public swimming pools rather than
integrate them, the Supreme Court found it
necessary to distinguish a school closing case,
Bush v. Orleans Parish School Bd., 187 F. Supp.
42 (E.D. La. 1960), afl'd, 365 U.S. 569 (1961).

It did so by stating.
[O]f course that case did not involve swimming
pools but rather public schools, an enterprise
we have described as "perhaps the most important function of state and local governments."
Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 221 n.6,
quoting Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483
(1954).

31 5 Cal. 3d at 604, 487 P.2d at 1258-59, 96 Cal.
Rptr. at 618-619.
32 Id., 487 P.2d at 1259, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 619.
33 Id.

'34

5) it "is so important that the state has
made it compulsory-not only in the requirement of attendance but also by assignment to a particular district and school.
Although a child of wealthy parents has the
opportunity to attend a private school, this
freedom is seldom available to the indi35
gent."
In combination, 36 the two factors of
classification by wealth and fundamental
interest demanded, for justification of the
uneven apportionment, a compelling state
37
interest unachievable by another means.
Defendants insisted throughout the litigation that the legislative plan should be measured against the "rational relationship"
standard.38 The locally collected and retained property tax, and thus the interdistrict spending variations, were, they
argued, reasonably related to California's
policy "to strengthen and encourage local
responsibility for control of public educa-

Id. at 609-10, 487 P.2d at 1259, 96 Cal. Rptr.
at 619.
35 Id. at 610, 487 P.2d at 1259, 96 Cal. Rptr. at
619.
36 It was acknowledged that wealth classifications have never been invalidated independent of
a limited set of fundamental interests, i.e., the
voting interest and the interest in fair criminal
process. 5 Cal. 3d at 604, 487 P.2d at 1255, 96
Cal. Rptr. at 615.
37 The "less onerous alternative" refinement of
the "compelling interest" burden was used in
Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965), involving the fundamental voting interest.
38 See, e.g., Respondents' Brief at 14-20, Serrano
v. Priest, 10 Cal. App. 3d 1110, 89 Cal. Rptr.
345 (2d Ct. App. 1970).
34
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tion." 3' In the court of appeal, they had
declared:
Despite their protestations to the contrary,
the actual achievement of appellants' goals

requires the abandonment of our tradition
of local control of public education and the
local property tax as the main source of
financing our public schools.4 0

Justice Sullivan's opinion countered by
pointing out that "local control" was divisible into the area of administrative control
and fiscal choice. Even if local administrative control were assumed to be a compelling state interest, the Serrano opinion
was not intended to affect it.41 As to the
asserted interest in local fiscal control, the
state was said to have relinquished all claim
to such a justification, since its policies
actually hampered local choice for poorer
districts:
[U]nder the present financing system, such
fiscal freewill is a cruel illusion for the poor
school districts....
• . . [S]o long as the assessed valuation
within a district's boundaries is a determi-

5 Cal. 3d at 610, 487 P.2d at 1260, 96 Cal.
Rptr. at 620, quoting CAL. EDUC. CODE § 17,300
(West 1969).
40 Respondents' Brief at 26, Serrano v. Priest,
10 Cal. App. 3d 1110, 89 Cal. Rptr. 345 (2d Ct.
App. 1970).
41 No matter how the state decides to finance its
system of public education, it can still leave this
decision-making power in the hands of local districts.
5 Cal. 3d at 610, 487 P.2d at 1260, 96 Cal. Rptr.
at 620. Local administrative control is deemed
desirable by commentators who favor a declaration of unconstitutionality of present financing
schemes. Much energy has been devoted to refuting the alleged incompatibility of local control and equalized educational opportunities. See
notes 106-15 and accompanying text infra.
39

nant of how much it can spend for its
schools, only a district with a large tax base
will be truly able to decide how much it
really cares about education. The poor district cannot freely choose to tax itself into
an excellence which its tax rolls cannot provide. Far from being necessary to promote
local fiscal choice, the present financing
system actually deprives the less wealthy
42
districts of that option.
There was, then, no compelling state
interest present to validate the "suspect
classification" of wealth as it affected the
fundamental interest in education.
Defendants' additional contentions that
a purposeful or intentional discrimination
must be alleged, that de facto wealth discrimination was not redressible, as well as
the underlying argument that, at most, what
was involved was de facto discrimination,
43
were all rejected.

42 5 Cal. 3d at 611, 487 P.2d at 1260, 96 Cal.
Rptr. at 620. According to the court's analysis,
the California plan should also be invalid under
the "rational relationship" test. That claim was
also raised by the plaintiffs. Complaint at 14,
Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241,
96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971); Appellants' Opening
Brief at 3, Serrano v. Priest, 10 Cal. App. 3d
1110, 89 Cal. Rptr. 345 (2d Ct. App. 1970). The
difficulty with a rational relation test is twofold:
it would fly in the face of an express legislative
declaration that "[elffective local control requires
a local taxing power, and a local tax base which
is not unduly restricted or overburdened." (CAL.
EDUC. CODE § 17,300 (West 1969); it would also
not involve the setting of a standard to ensure
equal educational opportunity.
43 Citing Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353
(1963) and Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12
(1956), the court noted that none of the previously invalidated wealth classifications had involved purposeful discrimination. "[T]hese prior

decisions have involved 'unintentional' classifications whose impact fell more heavily on the
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[W]e find the case unusual in the extent to
which governmental action is the cause of
the wealth classifications. The school funding scheme is mandated in every detail by
the California Constitution and statutes. Although private residential and commercial
patterns may be partly responsible for the
distribution of assessed valuation throughout the state, such patterns are shaped and
hardened by zoning ordinances and other
governmental land-use controls which promote economic exclusivity. . . . Governmental action drew the school district
boundary lines, thus determining how much
local wealth each district would contain....
Compared with Griffin and Douglas . . .
official activity has played a significant role
in establishing the economic classifications
44
challenged in this action.

Finally, Justice Sullivan dismissed the
argument that plaintiffs' claims had already
been resolved adversely by the United
States Supreme Court's summary affirmances of the three-judge federal court
opinions in Mclnnis v. Shapiro45 and Burruss v. Wilkerson,

46

two prior challenges

to school financing schemes.
Mclnnis had been the main stumbling
block to the Serrano claims in the lower
courts. The Superior Court of Los Angeles
cited Mclnnis in its order of dismissal, 47
and the court of appeals cited it throughout

poor." 5 Cal. 3d at 602, 487 P.2d at 1253-54, 96
Cal. Rptr. at 613-14.
44 5 Cal. 3d at 603, 487 P.2d at 1254, 96 Cal.
Rptr. at 614.
45 293 F. Supp. 327 (N.D. 111. 1968), aff'd mem.
sub nora Mclnnis v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 322 (1969)
(Douglas, J., dissenting).
V! 310 F. Supp. 572 (W.D. Va. 1969), aff'd
mem., 397 U.S. 44 (1970) (Douglas & White, JJ.,
dissenting). Burruss was affirmed on the basis of
Mclnnis.
47 10 Cal. App. 3d at 1114 n.7, 89 Cal. Rptr. n.7.

its affirmance, 48 except where the claim
under article IX, section 5, of the California
Constitution was considered.
Conceding that the Mclnnis affirmance
was "formally a decision on the merits," the
Serrano court nevertheless felt that the
weight of a summary disposition in the
case of a non-discretionary appeal was uncertain, "especially where, as in Mclnnis,
the Court cites no cases as authority and
49
guidance.
In any event, the court agreed with the
Serrano plantiffs that their contentions differed significantly from those raised in
Mclnnis. The Mclnnis Court was primarily
disturbed by the non-justiciability of the
plaintiffs' claim that resources must
be allocated according to "educational
needs."5 The Supreme Court's summary

Id. at 1114-17, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 348-50. Justice
McComb's dissent to the California Supreme
Court result was therefore also based on Mclnnis
because he simply cited the court of appeal opinion. 5 Cal. 3d at 619, 487 P.2d at 1266, 96 Cal.
Rptr. at 626 (McComb, J., dissenting).
49 5 Cal. 3d at 616, 487 P.2d at 1264, 96 Cal.
Rptr. at 624.
50 Id. at 617, 487 P.2d at 1264-65, 96 Cal. Rptr.
at 624-25. It is not true that no "needs" standard
was asserted in Serrano or that
[t]he instant complaint employs a familiar
standard which has guided decisions of both
the United States and California Supreme
Courts: discrimination on the basis of wealth
is an inherently suspect classification which
may be justified only on the basis of a compelling state interest.
Id., 487 P.2d at 1264, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 624 (emphasis added). The fact is that the Serrano complaint contained an allegation similar to that offered in Mclnnis:
The financing scheme . . . fails to meet the
minimum requirements of the equal protection
clause . . . [in that it] . . . [flails to take account of any of the variety of educational
4S
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affirmance was therefore held not disposilive of the issues in Serrano.

needs of the several school districts (and of
the children therein) of the State of California
Complaint at 12, Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584,
487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971). Of
course, discrimination on the basis of wealth
was also charged but, in the complaint, the
challenge was phrased purely in terms of the
traditional rational relation test. Complaint at
14, id.
The explanation of the discrepancies is that the
character of the Serrano suit changed radically
from the trial court to the Court of Appeal. The
"needs" standard was never mentioned again and
the "suspect classification"-"fundamental interest" rationale, ignored in the complaint, was
made central to the cause of action. See Appellants' Opening Brief at 15-29, Serrano v. Priest,
10 Cal. App. 3d 1110, 89 Cal. Rptr. 345 (2d Ct.
App. 1970); Petition for Hearing in the Supreme
Court, at 16-22, Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584,
487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 60 (1971).
The pronounced shift in rationale and the
adoption of a manageable "no-wealth standard"
(the complaint was more nebulously styled a
"suit to secure equality of educational opportunity" and the relief it asked for a restructuring of the finance system to provide
"substantially equal educational opportunities")
may be attributed to two events. The first was
the affirmance of Mclnnis by the Supreme Court
subsequent to the trial court's dismissal of Serranto. The second was the appearance of what has
become the definitive outline of school financing
systems and a constitutional route to their restructuring. Coons, Clune & Sugarman, Educational Opportunity: A Workable Constitutional
Test for State Financial Structures, 57 CALIF. L.
REV. 305 (1969) [hereinafter Coons]. The article
was amplified in J. CooNs, W. CLUNE & S. SUGARMAN,

PRIVATE

WEALTH AND

PUBLIC EDUCATION

(1970) [hereinafter PRIVATE WEALTH AND PUBLIC
EDUCATION]. The impact of the work of these
three authors on the course of the Serrano litigation and its outcome is readily apparent: their
analysis of the relevant case law is essentially
what appears in the Serrano opinion.
The Mclnnis outcome had another noteworthy
effect on the California suit. Plaintiffs tacked a

CATHOLIC LAWYER, SPRING

1972

[n stating its conclusions, the California
court made it quite plain that a constitutionally acceptable financing system could
not tie the quality of a child's education to
the wealth of his parents, neighbors or area
of residence. 51 It did not clarify whether
California constitutional claim under article IX,

section 5, onto their original equal protection
claim. See Appellants' Opening Brief at 34-39,
Petition for Rehearing at 10, Serrano v. Priest,
10 Cal. App. 3d 1110, 89 Cal. Rptr. 345 (2d Ct.
App. 1970); Petition for Hearing in the Supreme
Court at 23, Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487
P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971). Cf. Complaint, id.
51 5 Cal. 3d at 614-15, 617, 487 P.2d at 1263-64,
96 Cal. Rptr. at 623-24. This is a rephrasing of
the standard proposed by Coons, Clune and
Sugarman (and denominated by them "Proposition I"): "The quality of public education may
not be a function of wealth other than the
wealth of the state as a whole." Coons, supra
note 50, at 311, 340; PRIVATE WEALTH AND
PUBLIC EDUCATION, supra note 50, at 304. The

standard proposed by Coons et al. was even more
explicitly adopted (and its source acknowledged)
in the recent case of Van Dusartz v. Hatfield,
No. 3-71 Civ. 243 (D. Minn., decided Oct. 12,
1971).
Plainly put, the rule is that the level of spending for a child's education may not be a function of wealth other than the wealth of the
state as a whole.
Id. at 2. [All citations hereinafter to Van Dusartz
v. Hatfield will be made with reference to the
pagination of the memorandum and order as
filed in the district court on October 12, 1971].
This reenforces the view that the no-wealth (or,
as Van Dusartz labelled it, "fiscal neutrality")
principle was the constitutional standard adopted
in Serrano, because Van Dusartz cited Serrano as

direct authority. Since the standard is that articulated by Coons, Clune and Sugarman, it is appropriate to inquire how they define quality. In
Private Wealth and Public Education, they state:
[Q]uality . . . is . . . what is available . . .

whatever goods and services are purchased by
school districts to perform their task of education. Quality is the sum of district expenditures

per pupil; quality is money.
Id. 25 (emphasis added).

EDUCATIONAL

OPPORTUNITY

some additional element might be required
52
to meet the demands of equal protection,
and was noticeably wary of giving any
indication of what effect the ruling might
have on inter-locality disparities in the provision of other services such as police and
sanitation. Defendants had argued:
[11f the equal protection clause commands
that the relative wealth of school districts
may not determine the quality of public
education, it must be deemed to direct the
same command to all government entities
in respect to all tax-supported public serspell the
vices; and such a principle would
53
destruction of local government.
Defendants' alarm tactics were "unhesitatingly reject[ed]," 54 but in a manner that
clearly left the door open to future resolution of the substantive contention.55

The thought that perhaps more is involved
than the no-wealth principle is inspired by the
following language:
Plaintiff children have alleged facts showing
52

that the public school financing system denies
them equal protection of the laws because it
produces substantial disparities . . . in the

amount of revenue available for education.
5 Cal. 3d at 618, 487 P.2d at 1265, 96 Cal. Rptr.
at 625 (emphasis added). A requirement of substantial equality in revenues available per student
is quite a different thing from a no-wealth
standard. The latter would permit quality to be
a function of factors other than wealth, e.g., disadvantage, ability (factors personal to the child)
or non-personal, non-wealth factors such as district or family revenue-raising effort. See notes
109-15 and accompanying text infra.
53 Id. at 613-14, 487 P.2d at 1262, 96 Cal. Rptr.
at 622 (footnote omitted).
54 Id. at 614, 487 P.2d at 1262, 96 Cal. Rptr. at
622.
55 Although we intimate no views on other governnental services [emphasis added] we are sat-

isfied that, as we have explained, its uniqueness
among public activities clearly demonstrates

To homeowners weary of the ever-increasing demands of school budgets reflected in skyrocketing property taxes, the
Serrano opinion is of little direct benefit.
It by no means invalidated the property tax
as a means of financing education nor did
it state that property tax rates must be equal
throughout the state.
The resolution of the Serrano parents'
cause of action is unclear, probably because
it was entirely subordinate to that stated
by the children. The Serrano parents attacked the high tax rates in their lowwealth districts only because of the inequities in educational opportunities experienced by their children.56
The ecstasy undoubtedly felt by California property owners as a result of the
original opinion's careless intimation that
taxpayers in low wealth districts might
refuse to cooperate with the system, i.e.,

that education [emphasis in original] must re-

spond to the command of the equal protection
clause.
Id., 487 P.2d at 1262-63, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 622-23.
The federal district court in Van Dusartz was
considerably more negative on the issue. Education, it said, is to be "sharply distinguished"

from other governmental services and the decision in the instant case is "not . . . an opening
wedge for eventual fiscal neutrality in all government service .... ." Van Dusartz v. Hatfield,
memorandum and order at 7 n.8, No. 3-71 Civ.
243 (D. Minn., decided Oct. 12, 1971). The
commentators, at least for purposes of pressing
the educational equality arguments, are in agreement with the latter view. PRIVATE WEALTH AND
PUBLIC EDUCATION, 414-19; Silard & White, Intrastate Inequalities in Public Education: The
Case for Judicial Relief Under the Equal Protec-

tion Clause, 1970 Wis. L. REv. 7, 24-25 [hereinafter Silard].
56 See note 20 and accompanying text supra.
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withhold their taxes, 57 was quickly dampened by the modified opinion.
Of all the questions left unanswered by
Serrano, the most intriguing, because most
inscrutable, is the acceptability of the California court's rationale to the United States
Supreme Court.58

57

Plaintiff parents join with plaintiff children in
the prayer of the complaint . . . that defen-

Concern over the decision's anticipated
impact will also be generated in the following interrelated areas: overall quality and
continued viability of public school systems,
public and legislative response, local choice
in educational programming and financing
educational opportunities for minorities,
housing distribution, and interstate disparities in educational quality. A consideration
of the options and probabilities in some of
these areas follows.

dants be required to restructure the present financial system .

. .

. Such prayer for relief is

strictly injunctive and seeks to prevent public
officers of a county from acting under an allegedly void law. Plaintiff parents then clearly
have stated a course of action since [i]f the...
law is unconstitutional, then county officials
may be enjoined from spending their time
carrying out its provisions ....
5 Cal. 3d at 618, 487 P.2d at 1265, 96 Cal. Rptr.
at 625, quoting Blair v. Pitchess, 5 Cal. 3d 258,
269, 486 P.2d 1242, 96 Cal. Rptr. 42 (1971).
A suit commenced in New York subsequent to
the decision in Serrano promises to delineate the
denial of equal protection because of uneven
taxing argument. The gravamen of the complaint
in Spano v. Lakeland School Dist. No. 1, No.
10510 (Sup. Ct., Westchester County, filed Sept.
15, 1971) is that the present New York school
financing system "[u]nconstitutionally discriminates against the Plaintiff in that he is taxed
more heavily in order to provide education in his
school district." Complaint at 4, id.
58 It does not appear likely that Serrano itself
will reach the Supreme Court since there has
been no application for a writ of certiorari and
one of the principal defendants, California's State
Superintendent of Public Instruction, has announced that he would be positively opposed to
a review of the decision. N.Y. Times, Aug. 31,
1971, at 23, col. 3.
Serrano's rationale has already been adopted
by another court, however. Van Dusartz v. Hatfield, No. 3-71 Civ. 243 (D. Minn., decided Oct.
12, 1971). It will undoubtedly influence the outcome in educational finance cases that were already pending. E.g., Rodriguez v. San Antonio
Independent School Dist., Civil Action No. 68175-SA (W.D. Tex., filed July 30, 1968) (request
for three-judge court denied at 299 F. Supp. 476

BACKGROUND AND FUTURE OF EQUAL
EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY

Three factors seem most strongly present
in the background of the Serrano opinion
and of the extensive legal writing that
has long advocated such a result: 59 a wide-

(W.D. Tex. 1969) because of failure to join
proper party state officials with local administrators of finance scheme). Additionally, Serrano
has sparked new litigation, e.g., Milliken v.
Green, No. 13664-C (Cir. Ct. Ingham County,
Mich., filed Oct. 15, 1971) (equal protection suit
by Governor and Attorney General of Michigan
against State Treasurer and three wealthy school
districts); Spano v. Board of Educ., Lakeland
Central School Dist. No. 1, No. 10510 (Sup. Ct.
Westchester County, N.Y., filed Sept. 15, 1971).
A conference for attorneys interested in substituting Serrano-type litigation was held October
16, 1971 in Washington, D.C. under the sponsorship of the Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights
Under Law. A detailed model complaint was distributed to those attending. It seems, inevitable,
therefore, that the Serrano reasoning will be considered by the Supreme Court.
59 See, e.g., PRIVATE WEALTH AND PUBLIC EDUCATION; WISE, supra note 2; Silard, supra note 55;
Coons, supra note 50; Michelman, The Supreme
Court 1968 Tern Foreword: On Protecting the
Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83
HARV. L. REV. 7 (1969) [hereinafter Michelman];
Horowitz & Neitring, Equal Protection Aspects of
Inequalities in Public Education and Public Assistance ProgramsFrom Place to Place Within A
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spread conviction among those who have
studied present school financing systems as
to their educational undesirability and the
need for reform;60 the peculiar injustices of
the local property tax-based systems as to
both parent and child;6 and an expansionist
concept of the fourteenth amendment's
62
equal protection clause.

State, 15 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 787 (1968) [hereinafter Horowitz]. Some of the authors have assumed a very active role: Professor Horowitz
served as attorney for the Serrano plaintiffs, Professor Coons as counsel to the Van Dusartz complainants.
60 See generally Status and Impact of Educational Finance Programs, 4 NATIONAL EDUCATIONAL FINANCE PROJECT (R. Johns et al. ed.
1971); PRIVATE WEALTH AND PUBLIC EDUCATION;
REPORT

OF

THE NATIONAL

ADVISORY

COMMIS-

SION ON CIVIL DISORDERS 434-36 (Bantam ed.
1968); F. KEPPEL, THE NECESSARY REVOLUTION
IN AMERICAN

EDUCATION

(1966);

C.

BENSON,

A.

Preliminary Discussion

State support ("subvention") of school
district budgets ranges from 10 to 80 percent c of total revenues in all states except
Hawaii ,64 with the average level of support
at 41 percent. 65 Few states are at the extremes.66 Subvention or "equalization" aids
take three basic forms: "flat grant," "foundation plan" and "percentage equalizing"
plans.
A flat grant, as the name implies, is a
legislatively stipulated amount allocated
usually on a per pupil basis without regard
to special needs, local revenue raising ability or cost differentials from district to district."7 Seven states use this model or a refinement of it in which cost differentials are
68
taken into account.
Foundation plans involve the setting of a

THE CHEERFUL PROSPECT: A STATEMENT ON THE

FUTURE

OF

PUBLIC

EDUCATION (1965);
J.
(1961).
61 See notes 79-81 and accompanying text infra.
62 The use of the term "expansionist" may be
somewhat deceptive. In relation to the Serrano
opinion and the views of most commentators
mentioned in note 59, supra, it means a confidence in the flexibility of categories or guidelines already established by the United States
Supreme Court. For some, however, it may have
greater significance, as in the following conclusion about the judicial reasoning behind Reitman
v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967):
History-not the "original understanding," but
tomorrow's history-will validate the decision
as no satisfying doctrinal discourse could ....
No one-not even professional writers about
the court-would have been impressed by the
statement, "This is a bad law, but we are saying only that it is not unconstitutional": Thus
judicial activism feeds on itself. The public
has come to expect the Court to intervene
against gross abuses. And so the Court must
intervene.
Karst & Horowitz, Reitman v. Mulkey: A Telophase of Substantive Equal Protection, 1967 SuP.
CT. REV. 39, 79.
CONANT, SLUMS AND SUBURBS

From either point of view, the expansionist
concept appears to be based on a practical assessment of indicia of what the Supreme Court
may be prepared to do in the area of equal protection. In light of some recent developments, the
continuing validity of the assumption is questionable. See notes 149-53 and accompanying text
infra.
63 Coons at 312 n.20, citing A. MURSE, STATE
PROGRAMS FOR PUBLIC SCHOOL SUPPORT (U.S.

Office of Education 1965).
64 See note 3 supra.
65 N.Y. Times, Sept. 1, 1971, at 17, col. 1.
66 New Hampshire's state aid constitutes only

10 per cent of its school budgets; Delaware and
North Carolina are at the other end of the
scale. Coons at 312 n.20, citing A. MURSE, STATE
supra
note 63.
6;7 See Status and Ilmpact of Educational Finance
PROGRAMS FOR PUBLIC SCHOOL SUPPORT,

Programs, 4 NEFP 121 (R. Johns et al. ed.
1971); PRIVATE WEALTH AND PUBLIC EDUCATION
52-61; Coons at 313-14.
68 4 NEFP 121-22. The states are Arizona,
Arkansas, Connecticut, Delaware, New Mexico,

North Carolina and South Carolina. Id.
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foundation program (determination of the
amount to be spent in elementary, intermediate and high schools). A district
taxing its property owners at a specified
minimum rate will receive in state aid the
difference between the amount to be produced locally by taxation at the minimum
rate and the foundation program. A district
taxing itself above the minimum rate will
not have the added revenue deducted from
its state allocation. 69 By far the greatest
number of states-34--employ foundation
70
plans as their basic subvention approach.
Percentage equalizing plans theoretically
allow a district to set its own budget and receive state aid in inverse proportion to its
revenue-raising ability (computed by comparison to the average ability level of districts in the state).7 1 Six states purport
to use this plan,7 2 but it has been pointed
out that "no system in existence resembles
the theory. ' 73 Some of the shortcomings of
one percentage equalizing scheme-New
York's-will be considered in detail
4
later.7
The models are employed in combination
as well. One combination that has been
severely attacked is that of foundation plan
and flat grant, in which the flat grant is
added to the amount to be raised locally
and both are deducted from the foundation

CATHOLIC LAWYER, SPRING

1972

program in order to compute the amount
of equalization aid to be received. California, Illinois and Minnesota are among
the states using such a combination. 75 The
Serrano and Van Dusartz courts both noted
the peculiar inequities of the flat grant in
such a context: it is of no benefit to poor
districts since, without it, they would have
to be given the same total amount in equalization aid to bring their revenue up to the
foundation level. In fact, it aids only the
rich districts, since they would be ineligible
for any state aid if only a foundation plan
were used. 76 "[B]asic aid [the California
flat grant program], which constitutes about
half of the state educational funds . . .
actually widens the gap between rich and
poor districts," the Serrano majority de77
clared.
But, whatever their form, all state equalization programs have been found unable
to achieve any thing near equalization. It
can be mathematically seen, for example,
that foundation programs, once the hypothetical tax level is passed, cannot compensate for differences in tax base per
pupil. The foundation program guaranteed
amount is itself a minimum (e.g., $355 per

75 CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 17651-80, 17751, 17801,
17901, 17902, 17904 (West 1969); 1967 ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 122; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 124.211 (re-

cently expired but treated by Van Dusartz court
69 See 4 NEFP 122-23; PRIVATE WEALTH AND
PUBLIC EDUCATION 63-95; Coons at 314-15.
70

4 NEFP 122.

See 4 NEFP 123; PRIVATE WEALTH AND PUBLIC EDUCATION 163-97; Coons at 316.
71

72 4 NEFP 122. They are Iowa, Massachusetts,
New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island and Vermont. Id.
73 Coons at 316.
74 See notes 177-92 and accompanying text infra.

as if still in existence). Van Dusartz v. Hatfield,
memorandum and order at 3, No. 3-71 Civ. 243
(D. Minn., decided Oct. 12, 1971)).

76 Van Dusartz v. Hatfield, memorandum and
order at 4, No. 3-71 Civ. 243 (D. Minn., decided Oct. 12, 1971); Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal.
3d at 594-95, 487 P.2d at 1248, 96 Cal. Rptr. at

608.
,7 5 Cal. 3d at 594, 487 P.2d at 1248, 96 Cal.

Rptr. at 608 (emphasis added).
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elementary pupil in California),78 so dis-

tricts must tax themselves above the hypothetical level. Yet, beyond that minimum,
the increased efforts of poor districts, as
measured by tax rates, produce only minor
increments in revenue. Rich districts, on
the other hand, can maximize revenues with
little tax effort.
It has, in fact, been demonstrated that
low-wealth districts consistently tax themselves for education at higher rates than do
rich districts. 79 Yet, statistics also prove that
gross inter-district disparities in expenditures per pupil are a nationwide phenomenon. In 1959-60, 25 states had expenditure differentials (between high and
low spending districts) of over two to one,

78

Id. at 593, 487 P.2d at 1246, 96 Cal. Rptr. at

including
three to
penditure
including
1.51

four where the ratio was over
one.80 Seventeen states had exdisparities of over 4 to one,
seven with ratios in excess of 6 to

The phenomenon is by no means a citysuburban one:82 because of special tax
bases such as shopping centers, industry,
etc., the kind of educational offering in
neighboring suburban communities is just
83
as likely to differ.
It is apparent, then, that, regardless of
their labels, nearly all of the present school
financing arrangements are susceptible to
Serrano-type attack. In light of the data that
has been accumulated, the characterization,
by United States Commissioner of Education, Sidney P. Marland, of existing equalization plans as "antiquated" 8 4 seems mild
indeed.

606.
71) The results of a two-year study of Texas
school finances were recently summarized by
Joel S. Berke, director of the Educational Finance
and Governance Program of the Policy Institute,
Syracuse University Research Corporation, an
organization that has engaged in extensive educational finance research. The study showed that
poorer Texas districts regularly tax themselves
at higher equalized rates and realize lower yields.
Affidavit of Joel S. Berke at 3, 10 and Table 1I
at 13, Rodriguez v. San Antonio Independent
School Dist., Civil No. 68-175-SA (W.D. Tex.,
affidavit filed Oct. 1, 1971).
It has also been shown that the ten richest
California districts (in terms of assessed valuation per pupil) all spend more per pupil than
the poorest ten while, in all but one of the richest, tax rates are lower than in all the poorest
ten. Brief for Stephen D. Sugarman, The Urban
Coalition, The National Committee for the Support of the Public Schools and John E. Coons as
amici curiae at 10-11 ("Exhibit I"), Serrano v.
Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal.
Rptr. 601 (1971). See also Mclnnis v. Shapiro,
293 F. Supp. 327, 331 (N.D. Il. 1968), af0'd

,nem. sub noin. Mclnnis v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 322

(1969); Silard at 9; Coons at 317.

Although the relationship between dollars and quality remains problematical,85

80 WISE
McLOONE,

124-25

(source:

PROFILES

IN

F. HARRISON & E.
SCHOOL

SUPPORT:

A

DECENNIAL OVERVIEW (1965)).

8'

id.

As the district court in Mclnnis v. Shapiro
seemed to think. 293 F. Supp. 327, 336 n.38
(1968), afJ'd mern. sub nom. McInnis v. Ogilvie,
394 U.S. 322 (1969).
83 On suburban Long Island, New York, for
example, the town of Manhasset spends $1,721
on each of its students; the neighboring town of
East Meadow, with a property tax rate that is
33 percent higher, is able to spend only $968.
N.Y. Times, Sept. 5, 1971, § 4, at 7, col. 1.
84 N.Y. Times, Sept. 1, 1971, at 17, col. 1.
85 This is one of the evidentiary issues that remains open in Serrano. 5 Cal. 3d at 601 n.16,
487 P.2d at 1253 n.16, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 613 n.16.
One study of high school students found a positive relationship between resources such as expenditures per pupil, class size, library quality,
counseling programs and achievement test scores.
82
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a correlation is more than reasonable to
assume. The alternative is to believe that
millions of tax dollars are being wasted
and that the interest in local fiscal control
is totally irrational.
B.

Search for a Standard

Equalization of educational opportunity
is the goal of educational finance theorists
and litigants. But, the articulation of that
goal in concrete, judicially manageable
terms has been a continuing problem.
In his often cited book, Rich Schools
Poor Schools: The Promise of Equal Educational Opportunity, Authur E. Wise
listed nine proposed definitions of (and
constitutional standards for) equal educacational opportunity:
1) The "Negative Definition": "Equality
of educational opportunity exists when a
child's educational opportunity does not
depend upon either his parent's economic
circumstances or his location within the
state." ' 6 Wise criticized the definition as of

J. Thomas, Talent Development and the National
Income, in H. JAMES, J. THOMAS & H. DYCK,
WEALTH,

EXPENDITURES

AND

DECISION-MAKING

FOR EDUCATION 101-42 (1963). The leading
authority to the contrary is a report done for
the United States Office of Education which
determined that, except for teacher variables, resource inputs had a negligible effect on educational achievement. The primary determinants
of achievement were said to be home environment and the influence of fellow students. J.
COLEMAN

et

al.,

EQUALITY

OF

EDUCATIONAL

OPPORTUNITY (National Center for Education
Statistics 1966) ("The Coleman Report"). A
recent report of the Council for Basic Education
apparently affirms the existence of a correlation.
N.Y. Times, Oct. 29, 1971, at 1, col. 6.
86IWIsE 146.
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limited utility, since it "does not specify the
conditions for equality; it merely states the
conditions of inequality . . . ." He felt,
however, that it might prove attractive to
the Supreme Court since it "closely resembles the reasoning employed by the Court
's7
in the recent voting cases."
2) "Full Opportunity": This definition
assumes differences in the capacity of students to benefit from education and impractically proposes that resources must be expended on every individual until he reaches
the point of satiation. 88
3) The "Foundation Definition.

'0

4) "Minimum Attainment": This proposal would set grade achievement levels
and allocate resources to children until
they reached the appropriate level. More
resources would be directed at those below
90
norm.
5) The "Levelling Definition": Resources would be allocated in inverse proportion to a student's ability. An instance
of this would be compensatory education
for "culturally deprived" children. 91
6) The "Competition Definition": Like
"full opportunity," it is based on the assumption that children differ in capacity to
benefit from instruction but it would allo-

87 Id. 147. See note 51 and accompanying text
supra, notes 106-08 and accompanying text infra.
88 Id.

148-49.

89 149-50. See notes 69 and 70 and accompanying text supra.
91 Id.

151.

91 Id. 152-53. A constitutional requirement of
compensatory education is explored in Horowitz,
supra note 59, at 1166-72. Note, Equality of Education Opportunity: Are "Compensatory Programs" Constitutionally Required?, 42 S. CAL.
L. REV. 146 (1968).
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Cate more resources to those with greater
9 2
abilities.
7) The "Equal Dollars per Pupil Definition": This definition proceeds from the
judgment that, since a child has no control
over his native abilities, to allocate resources on the basis of ability is discriminatory. 93 Coons, Clune and Sugarman have
labelled this concept of equal educational
opportunity " 'one kid-one buck' levelism '' 94 and it has been almost universally
criticized because of its inflexibility and
failure to take into account factors such as
cost differences from area to area.9 5
8) The "Maximum Variance-Ratio Definition": This would involve a judicial determination that differences in per pupil expenditures should not exceed a (necessarily
rather arbitrary) maximum ratio. Thus, the
ratio of per pupil spending from highest
to lowest district should not exceed 1.2,
1.5 or some similar figure. 96
9) The "Classification Definition": Pupils would be categorized according to abilities, needs or other relevant characteristics.
Pupils within a given category would be
treated equally in terms of kind and cost
of programs. The approach can be rephrased "equality for all within a 'reasonable' classification. 97
Until recently, those attempts to articu-

late a constitutional standard of equal educational opportunity were discouraged by
two practical considerations that combined
to make questionable the enforceability of
any judicial mandate of equality. These
considerations may be called the "levelling
downward" and "subsidiarity" 9 problems.
There is a very strong fear that equality
in public education would necessarily involve a complete preemption of all budgetary and administrative decision-making
power by the state. The interest in a high
degree of local control to permit different
types of programming and experimentation
geared to the needs of differing school
populations is one that is common to parents who have long enjoyed it and those
newly discovering the ineffectiveness of
extremely large administrative units. 99
The alleged incompatibility of "subsidiarity" and fiscal equality has become
axiomatic. The Serrano defendants, for example, cited section 17,300 of California's
Education Code. The declaration of legislative intent states, inter alia:

9S "Subsidiarity" is a term coined by Coons,
Clune and Sugarman to describe the "principle
that government should ordinarily leave decision-

making and administration to the smallest unit of
society competent to handle them." PRIVATE
14.
09 In the latter category are residents of city
school districts where bureaucracy, central board
of education and unsatisfactory schooling have
become interchangeably descriptive. See, e.g., N.
LEVINE & R. COHEN, OCE AN-HILL BROWNSVILLE:
SCHOOLS IN CRISES (1969); D. ROGERS, 110
LIVINGSTON STREET (1968); MAYOR'S ADVISORY
WEALTH AND PUBLIC EDUCATION

153-55.
Id. 155-56.
94 Coons at 339.
95 See, e.g., Mclnnis v. Shapiro, 293 F. Supp.
327, 335-36 (N.D. 111. 1968), aff'd nen. sub
non. McInnis v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 322 (1969);
92 WISE
93

Silard at 25.
96 WisE 156-57.
97

Id. 157-58.

PANEL ON DECENTRALIZATION OF THE NEW YORK
CITY SCHOOLS, RECONNECTION FOR LEARNING: A
COMMUNITY

CITY

CONTROL SYSTEM FOR NEW YORK

(1967) ("The Bundy Report").
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The system of public school support should
be designated to strengthen and encourage
local responsibility for control of public
education .... Local control is best accomplished by the development of strong, vigorous, and properly organized local school
administrative units .... Effective local control requires that all local administrative
units ... have such flexibility in their taxing
programs as will readily permit of progress
in the improvement of the educational program. Eflective local control requires a local
taxing power, and a local tax base which is
not unduly restricted or overburdened.' 00
At the onset of the 1968 litigation, a

leading spokesman for this point of view
expressed the apprehension that the "inexorable" logic of the case for equality of
educational opportunity would lead the

United States Supreme Court to endorse it
by "propos[ing] simple answers for complex problems."' 1 1 Before extending its
"egalitarian revolution"' 1

2

into this area, the
Court was urged to consider the conceived

as inevitable consequences:
Statewide equality is not consistent with
local authority; national equality is not consistent with state power.
...It is impossible . . . to leave discretion
and choice to local government and expect
a uniformity of treatment among all units
of local government. Either the taxing
power or the spending power, and probably

100 CAL. EDUC. CODE §

17,300 (West 1969) (em-

phasis added).
101 Kurland, Equal Educational Opportunity: The
Limits of Constitutional JurisprudenceUndefined,
35 U. CH. L. REV. 583, 588 (1968) [hereinafter

Kurland].
102 Kurland, The Supreme Court 1963 Tern

both, will have to be transferred from local
03
to state control.'
Professor Kurland also raised the "levelling downward" problem as an argument for
judicial restraint. This issue, which should
not be minimized even now, is concerned
with the equality of education under an
equalizing plan: it is felt that, given the
enormous costs of education and the tremendous disparities that exist, such a plan
would most likely not raise all districts
within a state to the quality level of the best
and highest-spending district. A far more
likely result is that the best districts would
be levelled downward to some point to
which it was feasible to raise the majority
of (poorer) districts.
The combined effect of the two problems
could lead to a political explosion among
those who now enjoy high quality education and the tax blacklash might well make
an educational-equality victory meaningless.
Professor Kurland suggested that the rich
might withdraw their children from the
public schools:
[I]t could be argued that by putting everyone in the same boat, we force the influential members of our society to see the improvement of their lot by improving the lot
of all. The difficulty with this argument is
...that for the affluent, there is, as yet, no
obligation to remain in the same boat .... 104
The two problems were felt quite strongly
by the three-judge district court deciding
Mclnnis v. Shapiro:
Plaintiffs have assumed that requiring ex-

Foreword: "Equal in Origin and Equal in Title to

The Legislative and Executive Branches of the
Government", 78 HARV. L. REV. 143, 144 (1964).
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103 Kurland at 590.
104 Id. at 591.
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penditures to be related to the needs of the
students will result in better education for
deprived students without a corresponding
decrease in the quality of education now
offered by the affluent districts. The more
money the latter districts must supply to
the former, however, the less incentive the
well-to-do will have to raise their tax rates.

If the quality of good public schools declines, affluent children have the option to
attend private schools, thus completely eliminating the need for the wealthy to raise
taxes.105

Proposition I
The proponents of equality in public
education achieved their most significant
pre-Serrano breakthrough when Professor
Coons and Messrs. Clune and Sugarman set
forth their no-wealth constitutional standard
and ingeniously demonstrated that, far from
being incompatible with "subsidiarity," it
could be used to achieve a greater degree of
meaningful local control.
Their standard, adopted by the Serrano
and Van Dusartz courts, stipulates: "the
quality of public education may not be a
function of wealth other than the wealth of
the state as a whole."10 6 Remarkably similar
to that referred to by Wise as "the negative
definition,"'10 7 it is, as Professor Kurland
feared, a "simple answer," yet it is founded
on a thoughtful analysis of a whole range
of complexities. As its authors have pointed

105 Mclnnis v. Shapiro, 293 F. Supp. 327, 336
(N.D. I1. 1968), af/'d inem. sub nor. Mclnnis
v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 322 (1969)
(emphasis
added). The Mclnis court was apparently influenced by Professor Kurland's apprehensions.
Id. at 334 n.27, 336 n.35.
106 See note 50 and accompanying text supra.
107 See notes 86 and 87 and accompanying text
supra.

out, it is flexible, recognizing a great deal
of legislative discretion in the fashioning of
new, acceptable finance systems. It thus
eliminates judicial concern with the possibility of preempting a legislative function.
It does not, for example, "require flat
equality or have anything to say upon the
issue of compensatory education;"' 08 it
would, however, permit either approach.
Proposition I is a simple and enforceable
standard; its command is easily comprehended and it does not require a straining
of judicial ingenuity to determine when and
whether individual educational needs are
being met.
Perhaps most important, from the point
of view of achieving a consensus for equal
educational opportunity, Proposition I
would permit quality differences based on
local or family choice provided they were
not also tied to local or family wealth. Of
the finance system models that would accord with Proposition I, Professor Coons
and Messrs. Clune and Sugarman favor a
concept known as "power equalizing,"
which may be employed at either the school
district or family level. "Power equalizing"
is intended to create decentralized systems
that eliminate the effects of variations in
wealth while promoting local fiscal and administrative control. It would make the
quality of education a function of district
or family effort (as measured by tax rates)
rather than of wealth.
"District power equalizing" would "make
all districts equal in their power to raise
dollars for education.' 0 In its simplest

108 Coons at 312.

109 Id. at 319-20.

18
form, the state legislature would establish a
table of permissible school district tax rates,
each rate having a corresponding permissible level of expenditure per child. A poor
district electing to tax itself at a given rate
would be allowed to spend the corresponding amount per pupil regardless of whether
taxation at that rate actually produced the
appropriate amount of revenue. On the
other hand, richer districts would be permitted to spend only the amounts corresponding to their elected tax rates even
though the rates chosen produced excess
11 0
revenues.
The Serrano defendants had argued California's interest in local control in the following terms:
[i]f one district raises a lesser amount per
pupil than another district, this is a matter
of choice and preference of the individual
district, and reflects the individual desire for
lower taxes rather than an expanded educational program, or may reflect a greater
interest within that district in . . . other
services that are supported by local property taxes .... 111
As a less onerous alternative for effecting the state's interest, district power equalizing is clearly unassailable. Expenditures
per child are not, under present financing
schemes, a true indication of a community's
,interest in education. Within a district
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power equalized framework, however, expenditures would be a true indicator, because they correspond with varying degrees
of tax effort.
If "subsidiarity" is really an interest in
delegating authority to the smallest unit of
society capable of handling it, 112 then an
even more attractive alternative financing
scheme is "family power equalizing," the
other half of the power equalizing concept
developed by Coons, Clune and Sugarman.
Under this variety of voucher plan, a
family would select the rate at which it
wished to tax itself for education and would
receive scrip for the tuition amount selected
by the legislature to correspond with that
particular level of tax effort. Family income
per child is the wealth against which the
family effort would be measured. The legislature would also decide whether it wanted
to limit use of the plan to public schools,
extend it to private schools or opt to fulfill
its educational responsibility completely
through private schools. If private schools
were included, the legislature would have
the additional responsibility of providing
safeguards to maintain educational quality
and non-discrimination. In order to satisfy
the mandate of Proposition I, no powerequalized family would be allowed to supplement its scrip with private resources nor
would participating schools be permitted to
accept scrip and other payment from the
same family. 11 3

110 See, Coons at 319-21. Elsewhere the authors

discuss the district power equalizing proposal in
greater detail, suggesting adjustments of the basic
model to accommodate particular legislative concerns.

PRIVATE WEALTH AND PUBLIC EDUCATION

201-42.
MllRespondents' Brief at 21, Serrano v. Priest,
10 Cal. App. 3d 1110, 89 Cal. Rptr. 345 (2d Ct.
App. 1970).

112 See note 98 supra.
113 PRIVATE

WEALTH

AND
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256-68; Coons at 321-22. "Family power equalizing" thus differs radically from the voucher

system proposed by Milton Friedman. The Friedman model would utilize a flat grant voucher
which could be supplemented freely by parents
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Criticism of the failures of public school
systems has escalated in recent years.1 1 4 A
voucher system would undoubtedly be welcomed by many parents and educators who
would see it as offering three distinct benefits: diversity; improvement of the quality
of education generally through competition;
and, in a very vital way, restoring the
family's involvement in and responsibility
for the educational process. 115

and used in any school they desired. M. FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 87-102 (1962);
Friedman, The Role of Government in Education, in PERSPECTIVES ON THE ECONOMICS OF
EDUCATION 132-42 (C. Benson ed. 1963).
114 See, e.g., C. SILBERMAN, CRISIS IN THE CLASS-

(1970).
115 Voucher plans are not without their problems, of course. For an evaluation of the five
most developed voucher proposals, see Areen,
ROOM

Education Vouchers, 6 HARV.

CIV. RIGHTS-CIV.

L. REV. 466 (1971). The author discusses
three fundamental issues that every voucher plan
must consider: ensuring equal educational opportunity id. at 477-91); use of vouchers for support of religious schools (id. at 492-500); and
preserving quality in education (id. at 500-02).
The major premises of voucher systems are
summarized:
All such plans proceed from the assumption
that, while education is important enough in
our society to justify public financial support
. . . the traditional view that schools should
also be managed by the state does not necessarily follow. All voucher plans also accept the
premise that there is no one "best" school for
LIB.

all students .

. .

. Finally, all voucher plans

assume that parents should have the power to
choose which of the different "state-approved"
schools is best for their child.
Id. at 470.
Two of the creators of "power equalizing"
have recently drafted a detailed model voucher
act, entitled the "Family Choice in Education
Act." Coons & Sugarman, Family Choice in Education: A Model State System for Vouchers, 59
CALIF. L. REV. 321 (1971). A system proposed

by the Center for the Study of Public Policy has
been tentatively approved by the United States

The Trouble with Proposition I
It is no small tribute to the authors of
Private Wealth and Public Education that
their standard and their exposition of the
constitutional arguments for equality of
educational opportunity have already been
adopted by two courts. Their work also
promises to be the foundation of future
litigation in the area." 6
One very fundamental problem is, however, presented by Proposition I and, more
particularly, by its suggested implementation through power equalizing. Proposition
I, because it authorizes power equalizing,
permits the quality of a child's education to
be a function of district voters' interest in
and willingness to support education. As to
the child, is this any less a denial of equal
protection than a legislative scheme that
permits the quality of education to be a
function of the wealth of his parents, neighbors and district?
Suppose, for example, that a child lives
in a school district having more than an
average share of senior citizens, single persons or childless couples. Though the outcome can by no means be certain, it is certainly conceivable that the voters of such a
district would choose to make a less than
maximum (and likely less than average) tax
effort for the support of district schools. Is
the child attending public school in such a
Office of Economic Opportunity. Three cities
(Alum Rock (San Jose), Cal.; Gary, Ind.; and
Seattle, Wash.) are receiving OEO grants to
study the feasibility of instituting a demonstration project of the CSPP plan. Areen, Education
Vouchers, 6 HARV. Clv. RIGHIS-Civ. LIB. L. R-Ev.
466, 470 n.16 (1971).
l16 The model complaint mentioned in note 58

supra was drafted by Professor Coons.
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district being denied equal protection of the
laws? In the context of a statewide system
of public schools, is the interest of one district's voters any less a constitutional irrelevance than district and parental wealth
or geographical location? If so, must we
not conclude, as the Serrano court did with
respect to the accident of wealth, that the
fundamental interest of education cannot be

made a function of that irrelevant and fortuitous circumstance?
In a critique of the wealth-as-suspectclassification theory, one writer has already
taken notice of this flaw in Proposition I.1"7
Professor Michelman notes that it would
theoretically permit a district to shut down

its schools entirely,"18 thus depriving some
children of all educational opportunity.
Such a result would not have been achieved,
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sideration since, where "just wants""" are
concerned, there would be a positive duty
to fulfill them. 120 On the other hand, classifications on the basis of payment (de facto
wealth classifications) would never independently render a statute void.
If education be considered a "just want"
(and Professor Michelman obviously does
so consider it),121 a minimum protectionist
view of the equal protection clause would
not permit it to go unsatisfied.
Professor Michelman's analysis has the
virtue of candidly acknowledging the root
122
cause of existing educational inequalities.
But, while he sees family power equalizing
as the solution to the school finance dilemma,' 3 he fails to satisfactorily explain
why a minimum protectionist approach

he suggests, if the payment requirements
cases had been properly interpreted as hinging on the interest involved rather than on
the invidiousness of the wealth classification.

He advocates a "minimum protection"
approach to a reading of the equal protection clause. So far as the poor are con-

cerned, the approach visualizes the role of
the fourteenth amendment as protecting
them from the most hazardous fallout of

our free enterprise system. State action
would not be a particularly important con-

119 Whether a particular interest is a "just want"

is determined by inquiring
whether a person would insist on the relevant
assurances [of fulfillment] assuming that he
was (a) deprived of knowledge about whether
he personally will find himself in the relevant
predicament, but (b) sufficiently informed
about the organizing principles of the society
to be able to appraise (i) the frequency of the
predicament and (ii) the gravity, in such a
society, of the particular unfulfilled want.
Michelman at 35. Elsewhere, Professor Michelman has more so simply defined "just wants" as
those "which justice requires shall not go involuntarily unfulfilled." Id. at 30.
120 Id. at 11.
121 See id. at 47-59.

117

Michelman, supra note 59. See also Silard at

29.
118 Michelman at 53. Presumably, in authorizing
a district power equalizing scheme, a legislature
would set a minimum level of taxation. The point
here is that Proposition I does not commend that
a minimum be set and so does not preclude the
possibility of complete educational deprivation
for some children.

Professor Michelman feels that, in the equal
protection aspects of its work, the Supreme
Court should be seen as "a body commendably
busy with the critically important task of charting some island of haven from economic disaster
122

in the ocean of . . . free enterprise." Id. at 33.

Elsewhere he describes the Court's equal protection role as one of symptom-treating. Id. at 8-1I.
123 Id. at 53-57.
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would be any less content with the founda24
tion plans that now exist.
Moreover, Professor Michelman does not
see that the "family power equalizing" authorized by Proposition I also raises some
equal protection questions. While the classification of a child on the basis of his parents' willingness to sacrifice for education
may not appear to be "invidious,"' 12 1 yet, if,
as minimum protectionists would have it,
we are to look most strongly to the fundamentality of the interest or want involved,
then we would be bound to conclude that a
child whose parents are willing to sacrifice
very little for education is also being denied
equal protection.
There is another (and, from its originators' point of view, perhaps even more
damning) objection to Proposition I. Is it,
in fact, a wealth-free standard? One has to
wonder whether the poor should be considered free to decide how much they care
about education in the same way the rich
are free to make such a decision.
It is true that, in the past, poorer districts
have shown themselves willing to make
26
disproportionate sacrifices for education.'
Perhaps there would be only a few isolated
instances of poverty-enforced lack of choice
and perhaps only under a family power
equalizing plan, but (a) can we constitutionally afford to make that assumption, and
(b) can we be any less alarmed because
relatively few children would be deprived?
Yet Professor Michelman's whole discussion
the
educational finance issue is based on the
of

A Child-Centered Standard
If we are concerned about equality of
educational opportunity at all, it is presumably because a great number of children
are presently being denied their fourteenth
amendment right to equal treatment in the
most fundamental area of education. If their
parents and school districts are being discriminated against, it is only secondarily,
through the children's deprivation, that the
discrimination occurs.
The child must therefore be the focal
point in any search for a constitutional
standard that would ensure equality of educational opportunity. Proposition I is itself
constitutionally suspect precisely because it
focuses on the secondary discrimination
and seeks to relieve the primary denial of
equal protection only through relief of the
subordinate claim. Proposition I represents
a nice compromise, but it is satisfactory
only in a political sense.
Throughout their works, Professor Coons
and Messrs. Clune and Sugarman have
made a convincing argument that an educator's standard of equal educational opportunity-one based on an individual's abilities and need-goes beyond what a consti27
tutional lawyer would demand.1
The most satisfying standard would mandate substantially equal educational quality
in terms of resources (teacher quality, class
size, teaching materials, school (including
library) facilities, and ancillary (including
counseling) services) rather than dollars,

124

supposition that the existing systems are unacceptable. See id. at 47-59.
125 See, e.g., the definition of "invidious" offered
by Professor Michelman, id. at 19-20.
126 See note 79 and accompanying text supra.

If, indeed, the matter is still in doubt after
the Supreme Court's affirmance of Mclnnis v.
Shapiro, 293 F. Supp. 327 (N.D. I11.1968), aff'd
mem. sub nom. Mclnnis v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 322
(1969).
127

18
since costs differ from place to place. The
standard should, however, be flexible
enough to permit some experimentation and
the channeling of additional resources to
those with special needs or special abilities.
Since the primary objective is equal protection of the child, the standard must not
permit the quality of education to be a
function of factors wholly extraneous to the
child (such as parental wealth or tax effort
of a school district).
Such a standard would mandate that:
W4ithin the public education system of a
state, substantially equal resources must be
made available to every child at the same
grade level. Deviations from substantial
equality must be justified by reference to
educationally relevant characteristics of the
child.
Like Proposition I, the standard has the
advantages of simplicity, flexibility and enforceability. It perhaps lacks some of the
readily apparent political appeal of Proposition I. Although it does not dictate a completely centralized finance system, it obviously envisions close state monitoring (so,
it should be noted, does Proposition I). The
"substantial equality" measure would permit some extra local revenue raising but,
unlike Proposition I, the permissible local
effort would be strictly limited to a kind and
quantity that would not affect substantial
equality.
The Serrano court stressed that administrative and fiscal control are not inseparable.1 28 Equality of resources does not mean
sameness in programming. Local decisionmaking should, by all means, be fostered. It

12S

See note 41 and accompanying text supra.
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is not unreasonable to suppose that, once
the judiciary has acted to protect the longneglected fourteenth amendment rights of
children, parents and educators who have
strong interests in policy and administrative decentralization will make those interests known to the legislators charged with
formulating constitutionally satisfactory
12 9
school finance plans.
C.

A Supreme Court Serrano?

If and when a Serrano-type case comes
before the United States Supreme Court, the
Court must first determine the effect of its
holding in McInnis v. Shapiro 130 on the
issues presented. It will also be called
upon to decide the validity of the Serrano
rationale.
McInnis v. Shapiro
The three-judge court opinion in McInnis
v. Shapiro, summarily affirmed by the Supreme Court, should not be held inapplicable for the reasons stated by the Serrano
court, i.e., because significantly different

129 The myth of incompatibility of "subsidiarity"

and equality in education has been so long with
us that it perhaps requires a few concrete examples to dispel. See, e.g., N.Y. EDuc. LAW
§§ 2590-e & 2590-i (McKinney 1970) (delegating policy and administrative control of New
York City's pre-kindergarten through junior high
school programs to community school boards
while retaining a centralized budgetary process
for the entire city district). Regulations promulgated pursuant to Title I of the Elementary and
Secondary Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C.
§ 241a et seq. (1970)) have mandated a high
degree of local control in Title I programming.
130 293 F. Supp. 327 (N.D. 111. 1968), af'd mer.
sub nor. McInnis v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 322
(1969).
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contentions were raised by the plaintiffs in
the two cases; 131 it should be held inapplicable because it is riddled with inconsistencies
and factual misstatements and because the
educational finance area was not ripe for
judicial intervention at the time Mclnnis
was decided.
The Mclnnis plaintiffs were elementary
and high school students from four Cook
County, Illinois, school districts, representing themselves and others similarly situated.
Like the Serrano plaintiffs, they challenged
the entire state financing scheme. From the
court's opinion, it is apparent that, although
they placed great emphasis on allocation of
resources according to needs, 132 they did
not present that as the only constitutionally
permissible solution.
In fact, they suggested two alternate financing plans:
(1) [all students might receive the same
dollar appropriations, or (2) the state could
siphon off all money in excess of $ X per
pupil which was produced by a given tax
rate, in effect eliminating variations in local
property values while leaving the districts

pect classification of wealth, they did contend that education is a fundamental interest
and statutes affecting it require strict judicial scrutiny:
[U]nder the equal protection clause, the students contend that the importance of education to the welfare of individuals and the
nation requires the courts to invalidate the
legislation if potential, alternative statutes
incorporating the desirable aspects of the
present system can also achieve substantially equal per pupil expenditures.1 4
In the face of this argument, the McInnis
court expressly declined to adopt a strict
scrutiny test and utilized the traditional rational relation standard, citing economic
35
regulation cases.
One commentator has described Mclnnis
as a "thoroughly unsatisfying opinion."' "
A more precise description would be "confused." Although the court had been offered a number of non-needs alternatives,
it concluded, for two principal reasons, that
no cause of action was stated:
(1) the Fourteenth Amendment does not
require that public school expenditures be
made only on the basis of pupils' educational needs, and (2) the lack of judicially
manageable standards makes this contro137
versy nonjusticiable.

3
free to establish their own tax rates.1

The second suggestion is, of course, district power equalizing. The fact that it was
proposed in McInnis was pointedly ignored
by the Serrano plaintiffs as well as by the
developers of Proposition I.
Although the McInnis plaintiffs apparently did not agree that the Illinois financing
system was void because it utilized the sus-

131

See note 50 and accompanying text supra.

1.32 293 F. Supp.
133 Id. at 331-32.

at 329.

The Serrano court was right in concluding that the nonjusticiability of the "needs"
standard was the proclaimed ratio decidendi
of Mclnnis."38 But one wonders whether,

"34

Id. at 331.

135

Id. at 332.

336 Michelman at 48.
"37
138

293 F. Supp. at 239 (footnote omitted).
The McInnis court found the needs standard
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given the availability of alternatives to that
standard, the Mclnnis court was simply attempting to avoid a decision altogether.
At one point the court equated the
"needs" standard with an equal dollars per
pupil rule and thus was able to reject both
because "[e]xpenses are not . . . the exclusive yardstick of a child's educational
needs."139
The opinion is internally inconsistent
throughout. The court initially found:
Clearly, there are wide variations in the
amount of money available for Illinois'
school districts, both on a per pupil basis
140
and in absolute terms.
Yet, it was later stated:
The students also object to having revenues
related to property values, apparently without realizing that the equalization grant
effectively tempers variations in assessed
value.... 141
In its factual examination of the Illinois
financing plan, the three-judge district court
found:
Though districts with lower property valua"nebulous." Id. at 329 n.4. The Serrano plaintiffs
also utilized a "needs" standard in their complaint. See note 50 supra. Among the stranger
uses to which McInnis's condemnation of a
"needs" standard has been put is the validation
of Boston's administration of the National School

Lunch Program according to location of facilities rather than needs. The National School
Lunch Act expressly provides for provision of the
lunches according to need. Briggs v. Kerrigan,
307 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1969). See 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1757-58 (1970).
139 293 F. Supp. at
140

141

335.
Id. at 331.
Id. at 333 (emphasis added).
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tions usually levy higher tax rates, there is
a limit to the amount of money which they
can raise, especially since they are limited
142
by maximum indebtedness and tax rates.
Later, the court was (incredibly) able to
state:
[T]he General Assembly's delegation of authority to school districts appears designed
to allow individual localities to determine
their own tax burden according to the importance which they place upon public
143
schools.
These contradictions plus the indications
that the court had its eye too firmly fixed on
what it conceived to be the probable public
reaction,14 4 make the McInnis opinion
thoroughly unconvincing as the final word
on the constitutionality of present finance
systems.
If Mclnnis appears confused, then the
only appropriate description of the threejudge federal court decision in Burruss v.
Wilkerson 145 is "obtuse." The dismissal of
the attack on Virginia's financing plan was
affirmed summarily by the Supreme Court
on the authority of McInnis.
The Burruss plaintiffs were children, parents and property owners of Bath County,
Virginia. They charged that the Virginia
statutory scheme denied them equal protection in that it perpetuated substantial disparities in the "educational opportunities"
offered children in different areas of the
40
state.'
142 Id. at 331.
143 Id. at 333.
144 See note 105 and accompanying text supra.
145 310 F. Supp. 572 (W.D. Va. 1969), aff'd
nere., 397 U.S. 44 (1970).
1'10 Id. at 573.
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The Burruss court refused to perceive
locally raised funds as part of a common
statewide educational financing scheme
(despite the state constitutional provision) .4T It held that since the amounts distributed from the state school fund alone
were not dispersed so as to arbitrarily favor
one district more than another, there was
148
no denial of equal protection.
Assuming that the Supreme Court concludes that its summary affirmances of McInnis and Burruss do not foreclose consideration of a Serrano-style suit, two questions
remain: Will the Serrano rationale be found
acceptable and, if not, will the Serrano result be achieved notwithstanding? At the
outset, it should be stated that the addition
of two new members to the Court makes an
already unpredictable outcome even more
SO.
The contentions of the California plaintiffs and the California supreme court opinion rested on the twin pillars of wealth as a
suspect classification and education as a
fundamental interest for equal protection
purposes. In light of some recent United
States Supreme Court opinions, it is apparent that the majority regards the first
pillar as never having been erected.
The five-judge majority opinion in
James v. Valtierra1 49 rejected the motion
that there is something inherently suspect
about a wealth classification. The Court
upheld article XXXIV of the California
Constitution, which provides that an affirmative majority vote at a community elec-

(ion is required before any low-rent public
housing project can be undertaken by state
officials. Noting that no racial discrimination was alleged, Justice Black's opinion
for the Court stated, "[t]he Article requires
referendum approval for any low-rent public housing project, not only for projects
which will be occupied by a racial minority."' 150 There could hardly be a plainer instance of wealth classification but, in the
absence of an allegation of racial discrimination, the referendum measure was held
valid.
The point was not lost on the three
James dissenters. They protested that "explicit classification on the basis of poverty
[is] a suspect classification which demands
exacting judicial scrutiny ... "151
In another recent case, Boddie v. Connecticut, 52 the Court protected the indigent's access to the divorce courts despite
inability to pay filing fees. Although the case
appeared to be a direct descendant of the
Griffin-Douglas line, the majority deliberately adopted a due process rationale
rather than extend its equal protection holdings in the area of wealth classifications.
Here, too, the concurring judges felt that
the opinion was an aberration from the pattern of previous decisions that utilized
55
equal protection analysis.'
It seems reasonable to conclude, then,
that the first pillar of the Serrano reasoning
is, at best, undependable. As to the second,
the Serrano court itself conceded that the

150 Id. at 141 (emphasis added).

151 Id. at 144-45 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
See note 2 supra.
148 310 F. Supp. at 574.
149 402 U.S. 137 (1971).
147

152

401 U.S. 371 (1971).

'53

401 U.S. at 383-85 (Douglas, J., concurring);

401 U.S. at 388 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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theory of educational as a fundamental interest for equal protection purposes was
not supported by any direct authority. Unlike wealth-as-suspect-classification, however, education as fundamental interest has
not been rejected by the Supreme Court.
There is reason to believe that the Court
would accept the idea that education is an
interest sufficiently fundamental to require
a demonstration of compelling interest when
the state undertakes to provide it and fails
to do so on an equal basis to all.'54 Although the many dicta that appear on the
subject in various Supreme Court opinions
are not controlling, they are of great persuasive value in that they have appeared over
an extended period of years and have enjoyed the whole-hearted support of the
Court. It is, after all, absolutely impossible
to dispute the central importance of education to both the individual and society. The
''egalitarian revolution" seen emerging in
the early sixties was, on the other hand, of
relatively recent origin and failed to gain the
unanimous support of the Court's members.
One other question should be asked: Can
the interest in education be buttressed by
any other argument when the issue of
equality of educational opportunity is presented to the Supreme Court?

There is another argument that was ignored by the Serrano plaintiffs and court
but which presents a most appealing case
for close judicial scrutiny of school financing systems-the character of those whose
interests are most directly affected, the nation's school children. The matter has been
considered by a few authors' 5 5 and was discussed in an amicus brief submitted to the
California supreme court.' 56
Children are probably the best example
157
of those "discrete and insular minorities"'
whose interests require strict protection
under the equal protection clause. They are
politically helpless and are without defense
against abuse of the majoritarian process.
For political purposes, they are not even
counted a minority.
Furthermore, parents are not always to
be relied upon as satisfactory political surrogates for their children:
[T]he truth is that a very significant number
of children do not have voting parents. This
failure to vote is a neglect of their interest
that children are helpless to alter. Second,
even the parent who does vote is subject to
many influences that conflict with the educational interests of his children. 15 8

"55

154 If education were recognized

as a funda-

mental interest, it would join the interest in voting (Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701
(1969); Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395
U.S. 621 (1969); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966)); the interest in interstate travel (Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618
(1969)); and the interest in personal liberty
(Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963),
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956)) in that
category.
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See, e.g., Michelman at 37-38 n.90; Coons at

389-95.
1356Amici Curiae Brief of Stephen D. Sugarman
et al. at 24-26 Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584,

487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971).
157 United States v. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S.
144, 153 n.4 (1938).
158 Amici Curiae Brief of Stephen D. Sugarman
et al. at 25, Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487
P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971). The last
point is graphically illustrated by the fact that the
national approval rate of local bond issues for

educational purposes dropped from 79.6 per cent
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The Supreme Court previously has not
hesitated to protect those who are effectively
unrepresented in a state's political structure,
including interstate carriers159 and foreign
corporations1 60 in addition to racial and
ethnic minorities. Although it is true that, in
the school finance cases, children are not
being discriminated against as a class,
nevertheless, the interests being affected are
the interests of children-the great majority
of children.
There is reason to believe that the test
of validity of legislation under the equal
protection clause involves a balancing of
interests. The categories that have evolved
-"rational relationship," "suspect classification," "fundamental interest," "strict scrutiny" and "compelling interest"--can be
seen as representing a kind of judicial shorthand that is applied when certain interests
have consistently been found to weigh or
not to weigh very heavily in the balance. 61
There is no reason why the Supreme
Court should not frankly acknowledge an
equal protection balancing test since it is
compatible with the case law and would
eliminate existing confusion over "special"
categories and different types of standards
applied at different times. If such a view
were adopted, the interests of children
would almost certainly be accorded great
weight, both in the balance of individual interests and the balance of societal interests.

in 1959 to 43.6 per cent in 1969. N.Y. Times,
Sept. 19, 1971, at 45, col. 1.
159 South Carolina State Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., Inc., 303 U.S. 177 (1938).
160 WHYY Inc. v. Borough of Glassboro, 393
U.S. 117 (1968).
161 See Michelman at 30 n.70, 34, 36.

CITY SCHOOL

FINANCING AND EQUAL

EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY

[T]he public schools' most acute financial
62
crisis is in the cities.'

Among the more obvious predictable effects of the Serrano decision are a re-eval-

uation of existing school finance systems,
with an emphasis on finding new means of
support;'0 a probable increase in the qual-

162 McInnis v. Shapiro, 293 F. Supp. 327, 336
n.38 (N.D. 111. 1968) afl'd mem. sub nom. McInnis v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 322 (1969).
163 It has been reported that Connecticut, Maryland and Michigan are already considering financing alterations in light of Serrano. N.Y. Times,
Oct. 18, 1971, at 43, col. 1; id., Sept. 2, 1971, at
55, col. 1. New York State's system has been
under evaluation since 1969 by its Commission
on the Quality, Cost and Financing of Education.
The panel, which is due to make its legislative
recommendations this month, was apparently
spurred to new activity by the Serrano opinion.
N.Y. Times, Oct. 18, 1971, at 1, col. 8.
New sources of support will have to be found
in order to avoid the "levelling downward" problem (see notes 98-105 and accompanying text
supra) and to maintain present program levels.
In this respect the property tax has proven itself
inadequate. The income from real estate taxes increases only one percent a year unless raised
legislatively, while school operating budgets
throughout the country generally increase at a
rate of 15 to 18 percent a year. Discontent over
rising property taxes may lead to greater public
acceptance of the Serrano rationale where it
would be presumed to be lacking. See complaint,
Spano v. Lakeland School Dist. No. 1, No. 10510
(Sup. Ct., Westchester County, N.Y., filed Sept.
15, 1971) (where a suburban taxpayer claimed
a denial of equal protection in comparing his tax
rate and return-in terms of expenditures per
child-with those of neighboring suburban communities). Legislatures can be expected to look
to statewide property taxes, income, sales and
corporate taxes for additional school revenues.
See note 196 infra. It has been estimated that

18
ity of education for poor and minority
group students; 16 4 and a new call for federal
aid to bolster state education budgets and
eradicate the great disparities in spending
165
that exist from state to state.
Because the effects are less obvious and
their exploration useful in locating factors
that a finance system should consider, the
remainder of this Note will be devoted to

approximately 20 states could finance education
entirely from income and sales taxes if they made
as great a use of those taxes as the "heavy user
states" now do. Silard at 30, n.83.
164 The result in Serrano was not based on any
racial factors. However, the unfortunate tendency
of money to flow inversely to the proportion of
minority students in a school was documented
in the case of Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp.
401 (D.D.C. 1967). While that case dealt with
intra-district disparities, it has been found that
there is a definite correlation between property
values per pupil, expenditures per pupil and percentage of minority pupils. Affidavit of Joel S.
Berke at 4, 6, Rodriguez v. San Antonio Independent School Dist., Civil Action No. 68-175SA (W.D. Tex., affidavit filed Oct. 1, 1971).
The affidavit, summarizing a two-year study of
Texas school finances, also found a positive correlation between district wealth, individual wealth
and expenditures per pupil. Affidavit at 3-7, 9,
id. To the extent that large numbers of poor and
minority children tend to live in large cities, the
optimistic outlook might have to be modified
somewhat. See notes 166-93 and accompanying
text infra.
165 The Governor of Pennsylvania has proposed
that a national education trust fund, similar to
the present highway trust fund, be established.
N.Y. Times, Oct. 30, 1971, at 31, col. 2. Calls
for increased federal funding, particularly in the
general rather than categorical aid area, have
also issued from the National Education Finance
Project (id., Nov. 3, at 53, col. 1); the Presidential Commission on School Finance (id., Sept.
19, 1971, at 45, col. 1); and the U.S. Commissioner of Education (id., Sept. 1, 1971, at 17,
col. 1). Some of the interstate disparities were
discussed in Levi, The University, The Professions and the Law, 56 CALIF. L. REV. 251 (1968).
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examining the impact of Serrano on city
schools.

Preliminarily, it is not at all clear that a
Serrano-type mandate of educational equality would have a salutary effect on the financial problems that now beset boards of
education in the large cities.
As the Serrano opinion itself demonstrated and as commentators have long advocated, the constitutional standard, if and
when promulgated by the United States
Supreme Court and, in the meantime, as
promulgated by state and lower federal
courts, will be a simple and flexible one, allowing the greatest possible legislative discretion in the fashioning of new financial
schemes. 166 In all probability the standard
will be a negative one, 167 implying no obligation to proceed in any particular direction
except away from the zone of proscribed
systems.
The financing problems of the large cities
require precisely the kind of fine tuning that
courts will want to (and, indeed, find it
necessary to) avoid in setting the initial
broad standards for educational equality.
For this reason, the effect of Serrano on city
school systems is unpredictable.
Van Dusartz v. Hatfield, memorandum and
opinion at 10, No. 3-71 Civ. 243 (D. Minn., decided Oct. 12, 1971); Amici Curiae Brief of
Stephen D. Sugarman et al. at 35-36, Serrano v.
Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal.
Rptr. 601 (1971); Amici Curiae Brief of Center
for Educational Policy Research at 2, 19, id.;
Coons at 324-25, 340-41. It was precisely because Professor Kurland foresaw the adoption
of a simple standard (Kurland at 588) that he
feared a judicial declaration of equality in public
education "will probably only be the creation of
a greater problem .... " Id. at 583.
167 WISE 58-59. See notes 51, 87, 106 and accompanying text supra.
I16
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The constitutional standards that have
been suggested, including mandates of equal
educational resources per pupil, fiscal neu-trality, non-discrimination against the poor
and even allocation of resources or dollars
according to need, 168 would still permit
legislatures to make incorrect assumptions
as to the abilities of localities, particularly
cities, to raise revenues for school support.
New York State's educational allocations
system provides a good example of the
failure, as to its cities, of an effort to correct the inequities of the flat grant and
foundation plans of subvention. For our
purposes, that failure is illustrative of the
kind of fine tuning mechanisms that a realistic appraisal of urban needs and revenueraising abilities would require.
1609
Enacted in 1962, the New York scheme
70
is classified as "percentage equalizing.'
The basic general aid program operates
essentially as follows: a district's "actual
valuation"'171 of real property per unit
of weighted average daily attendance
(WADA) 172 is calculated. The district's

168 See notes 169-97 and accompanying text in-

fra.
169

N.Y. SEss.

LAWS

1962, c. 657 (N.Y. EDUC.

LAW § 3602 (McKinney 1970)).
170 See notes 71-73 and accompanying

text supra.

New York's plan, as will become evident in the
text, seems actually to be a foundation plan with

the twist of a fairer method of calculating ability.
171 "Actual valuation" incorporates a correction
for local assessment variables. N.Y. EDUC. LAW
§ 3602.1.c (McKinney 1970).
The "weighing" of average daily attendance
involves a cost correction for different grade

"aid ratio" (the percentage of operating
expenses per pupil to a ceiling of $860 that
the state will absorb) 17 3 is computed in inverse proportion to the ratio of the district
wealth figure and the state's average actual
17 4
valuation per unit of WADA.
On the surface, the comparison of district wealth to average state wealth seems
a vast improvement on traditional founda.tion plans. 175 The state's "big six' u7 6 cities
have not found it so, however. Under the
formula, New York City's "aid ratio" for
1971-1972 is .253. The state-wide average
ratio is .490, the average ratio for districts
outside the "big six" being .603.177 The
"big six" receive less aid per pupil than all
other types of districts while paying more
tax dollars per pupil. 178 The end result is a
lower average total expenditure per child
179
in the cities.
The explanation is, quite simply, that
under the formula New York's large cities
appear to have greater revenue-raising abilities than do other districts, that is, they have
80
higher valuations per unit of WADA.-

statutory scheme actually involves a further
refinement of this figure to determine "resident weighted average daily attendance" (Id.
§ 3602.2.e), a factor which does not affect the
analysis here.
173 Id. § 3602.5.b.
174 Id. § 3602.3.
175 See notes 69-70 and accompanying text supra.
170 Albany, Buffalo, New York, Rochester, Syracuse, and Yonkers.
177 CONFERENCE

OF

PROGRAM

172

EDUCATION,

levels. Thus, half-day kindergarteners "count" for

after PROGRAM 1971].
178 Id. 6, 7.

half the WADA of the base unit; full-day kindergarteners and first through sixth graders count
for 1.00 of the base. High school students "count"
for 1.25 the base WADA. Id. § 3602.2.a. The

LARGE

CITY

BOARDS

1971, 22 (1971)

OF

[herein-

N.Y. Times, Oct. 18, 1971, at 1, col. 8.
180 The situation is not unique to New York's
cities. The lack of immediately apparent disparities in assessed valuations per pupil may have
179

18
The boards of education of the "big six"
contend, however, that appearance does not
correspond to reality because the local
ability index fails to take account of the
following factors that drain city resources
disproportionately: non-school services, 181
special education needs, higher costs and
tax exempt properties. Additionally, they
argue that the operating expense ceiling is
unrealistic and the WADA measure operates to reduce city allocations without com8 2
mensurate cost reductions.1
The problem of "municipal overburden"
is factually corroborated in New York by a
breakdown of the 1970-1971 local property
tax dollar. Nearly 76 cents of every "big
six" dollar (78 cents of every New York
City dollar) went to non-school purposes
(police, fire sanitation, etc.); the average
non-school cost for other local governments
was 49.1 cents of the tax dollar.' 1s The
state's failure to measure "municipal overburden" is particularly troubling when one
considers that the non-school services of the
municipal centers are provided for large
numbers of non-residents. This commuter
population reaps the double benefit of city
services without cost and increased state
school revenues in their home districts 184

hurt the Cook County plaintiffs in Mclnnis. Chicago, it has been pointed out, is not a low-wealth
district and was, therefore, a poor location from
which to launch an attack on the Illinois funding
scheme. Coons at 411.
181 This phenomenon is generally referred to as
"municipal overburden." Coons at 342-43.
182 PROGRAM 1971 passn.

183 Id. at 21. (source: New York State Division
of Municipal Affairs, Dep't of Audit and Control).
184 In fairness, it should be noted that non-residents working in New York City pay a commuter
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Two formulae adjustments that would
correct the ability index according to the
degree of "municipal overburden" have
been proposed. One would calculate wealth
as "full property value per capita" rather
than "full property value per pupil." 18 5 The
other suggestion would adjust the wealth
index by a "value reduction ratio." The
ratio would be computed on the basis of a
comparison of the percent of municipal
taxes per WADA required for non-school
purposes and the statewide non-municipal
average."",
City boards of education also support a
disproportionate share of high cost special
education programs. Thus, while New
York's "big six" educate 38 percent of the
state's total pupil population, that percentage includes 63 percent of the state's handicapped, 86 percent of children receiving
Aid to Dependent Children and 65 percent
of full-time vocational students. 187 Yet,
average daily attendance is not weighted to
88
account for these extra costs.'
The WADA measure, used in virtually
all cost calculations, has other difficulties.
Large cities tend to have high dropout and
absentee rates, 8 9 a factor which does not
reduce costs because programs must be
drawn up on the basis of enrollment. New

income tax to the city. Residents also pay a city
income tax, of course, in addition to real property taxes.
185 PROGRAM 1971 3, 11.
180 P. MORT, UNIFICATION OF FISCAL POLICY IN
NEW YORK STATE IN PERSPECTIVES ON THE
ECONOMICS OF EDUCATION 345-46 (C. Benson ed.

1963).
187 PROGRAM 1971 5, 6.
188 N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 3602.2 (McKinney 1970).
189 PROGRAM 1971 15.
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York's large city boards have proposed that
the measure be changed to weighted average enrollment and be further adjusted to
include summer and continuing education
enrollments' 9" presently unaccounted for.'"
The above discussions give some idea of
the multiplicity of considerations essential
to a fair assessment of urban ability to support educational programs. 92 Because (1)
the primary target of Serrano was discrimination against districts having low per-pupil
valuations and (2) the equal protection
theories advanced by school finance theorists deal only with "the grosser objective
aberrations of existing systems,' 1

93

it is

clear that Serrano per se will not be of great
benefit to large city districts having characteristics similar to New York's "big six."
Serrano will, however, have the effect of
forcing reappraisals and major overhauls of
school financing systems throughout the
country. 94 It also marks the entrance, in a
190 Id. 2, 9.
191 N.Y. EDoC. LAW. § 3602.2 (McKinney 1970).
192 The list is far from complete. Some other
factors that should be evaluated are percentages
of tax exempt properties, constitutional or statutory limitations on local tax effort, and differentials affecting capital improvement costs (e.g.,
site costs). Nearly 40 percent of valuations are
exempt from taxation in New York's large cities
(47.7 percent in Albany) while the non-"big
six" average is 20.6 percent. PROGRAM 1971 23
(source: New York State Division of Municipal
Affairs, Dep't of Audit and Control). Despite
their greater costs, New York's cities are hampered in their fund-raising efforts by constitutional
proscriptions. New York City's real property tax
ceiling is two and a half percent (N.Y. CONST.
art. VIII, § 10(f); the other large cities are
limited to a two percent effort (Id. § 10(b)); the
rest of the state's localities may tax at four percent (Id. §§ 10(b) & (c)).
193 Coons at 344.
194 See note 163 supra.

major role, of the judiciary into the school
finance arena. These two aspects of the
California decision do have great significance for city schools.
Whether the impact will be beneficial remains to be seen but an initial, perhaps
cynical, reaction is that the latter aspect is
more promising. The cities have not fared
well legislatively in the past.' 95 If similar
insensitivity is displayed in revising present
finance schemes, the fiscal plight of city taxpayers, if not the school budgets, could
actually be worsened. 196
A new judicial willingness to scrutinize
school finance schemes, particularly under
the equal protection clause, may well bene-

See, e.g., New York's statutory scheme described in text accompanying notes 170-92 supra.
As a further example, former subdivision 8(c) of
New York Education Law section 3602 providing
a 17.5 percent size-related cost correction for
New York's large city districts was repealed.
N.Y. Sess. Laws 1969, c. 183, § 14, eff. July 1,
1970.
1906If, for example, a statewide uniform rate
property tax for education were levied without
taking account of municipal overburden and
other factors cited above, it is quite conceivable
that total city property taxes would rise, for the
education component almost certainly would.
See note 183 and accompanying text supra. A
proposal for such a tax will reportedly be advanced this month by the majority of New York's
Commission on the Quality, Cost and Financing
of Education ("The Fleischmann Commission").
N.Y. Times, Oct. 18, 1971, at 1, col. 8. The statewide uniform rate education property tax is apparently only an interim proposal, however, and
the Commission's majority favors an eventual
shift of the total education finance burden to
income or other taxes viewed as more clearly
indicative of individual wealth. Id. In the event
of such a shift, city residents might still fare
poorly if the individual share of "municipal overburden" (reflected in city income taxes and nonschool city property taxes) is not considered.
195

18

fit the cities and their schools; Serrano's
more immediate effect will not, however.
With regard to this, two matters should be
briefly discussed.
The cities' unequal share of the "special
education" burden has already been
noted. 197 Yet, Mclnnis 98 and Burruss'99

would seem to preclude an "individual
needs" equal protection attack on inequita2 00
ble financing of this burden.
There is, however, another type of needs
standard, not condemned by Mclnnis and
Burruss, which might serve the cities well.
This is an "area needs" approach. That is
to say, an attack might be made on a state
financing scheme that failed to take account
of the categorical and more objectively obvious needs of an entire district. Burruss is
puzzling on this issue: The three-judge
court quoted from a section of the complaint that expressly referred to just this
type of standard:
The Act ...

utterly fails in any manner or

See text accompanying note 187 supra.
198 McInnis v. Shapiro, 293 F. Supp. 327 (N.D.
Ill. 1968), aff'd mem. sub nona. Mclnnis v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 322 (1969).
199 Burruss v. Wilkerson, 310 F. Supp. 572
(W.D. Va. 1969), aff'd men., 397 U.S. 44
(1970).
200 Considering the attacks that have been made
on Mclnnis and Burruss, this may not be an unassailable proposition, however. See, e.g., Coons
at 308-09, 351-52 n.134. One area that might be
ideal for distinction is precisely that posed by the
special education burden of the cities in regard
to the mentally and physically handicapped, vocational education and non-English speaking
students. Those needs are readily identifiable and
quantifiable and so do not present the judicial
unmanageability problems of an across-the-board
individual needs standard cited by the Mclnnis
and Burruss courts.
197
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to any extent whatsoever . . . to relate to
any of the variety of educational needs of
the several counties and cities of the State
of Virginia-much less weigh the relative

acuteness of these needs or provide any
sort of balanced response to them ....

2o1

In its opinion, however, the court ignored
the "area needs" allegation, interpreting it
as a request for an "individual needs" standard and asserting non-justiciability on the
basis of that understanding:
[T]he courts have neither the knowledge,
nor the means, nor the power to tailor the
public moneys to fit the varying needs of
20 2
these students throughout the State.
If this analysis is correct, it cannot be
said that the Burruss opinion ruled out an
"area needs" standard even though that
claim was made in the complaint.
A final point should be made in relation
to the impact of Serrano on city schools: In
addition to its forced reappraisal of statutory financing systems, the decision promises to inspire entirely new approaches to
the subject of school funding. It has, for
example, been proposed that the federal
government assume the administration and
financing of the country's 25 largest urban
school systems. 20 3 Without commenting on
the merits and ramifications of that particular proposal, hopefully it indicates that
a whole range of original suggestions will
be brought to bear on the problem of city

201 310 F. Supp. at 573 (emphasis added).

202 Id. at 574 (emphasis added).
203 The proposal was made by Dr. Mark R.
Shedd, Philadelphia's Superintendent of Schools,
in testimony before the Senate Select Committee
on Equal Educational Opportunity. N.Y. Times,
Sept. 22, 1971, at 26, col. 4.
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schools-and, indeed, all schools-in the
wake of Serrano.
CONCLUSION

The public school has been described as
"the most powerful agency for promoting
cohesion among a heterogeneous democratic people" 20 4 and "the symbol of our democracy and the most persuasive means for
'20 5
promoting our common destiny.
So long as present financing schemes
perpetuate the inequities of the past, that
statement can be no more than the expression of an admirable but unrealized ideal.
Each of the states now has, in effect, a
series of school systems differing radically
in the quality of education offered.
It is not difficult to conclude that educational finance is one of the few genuine
equal protection frontiers remaining. From
that perspective, Serrano v. Priest represents a tremendous exploratory step forward. The standard adopted by Serrano
204 Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ.,

333 U.S. 203, 216 (Franfurter, J., concurring).
205 Id. at 231.

should not, however, be regarded as the
final word on the parameters of constitutionally acceptable finance schemes. It is
submitted that the standard 20 6 and twopronged litigation approach 20 7 sugggested
in this Note would, in fact, be more satisfactory both in terms of meeting the fourteenth amendment mandate and in achieving the desired result.
The practical problems that will accompany a decision for educational equality
should not be minimized. In particular, the
greatest legislative attention and ingenuity
will be required to maintain quality and
decentralized decision-making and to ensure that revenue-raising ability is fairly
calculated. The fact that the advocates of
education finance reform have been exceedingly careful to accommodate these
concerns should, however, be encouraging
as to the probability that a judicial resolution of the matter will ultimately achieve
the objective envisioned by Mr. Justice
Frankfurter.

206 See text accompanying notes 127-29 supra.
207 See notes 154-61 and accompanying text
supra.

